The Information Theoretical Privacy And The Impact Of Communication Channel On Information Theoretic Privacy by Demir, Mehmet Özgün


ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITYF GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SCIENCE
ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY
THE INFORMATION THEORETICAL PRIVACY AND
THE IMPACT OF COMMUNICATION CHANNEL ON
INFORMATION THEORETIC PRIVACY
M.Sc. THESIS
Mehmet Özgün DEMI˙R
Electonics and Communication Engineering Department
Telecommunications Engineering Programme
DECEMBER 2016

ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITYF GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SCIENCE
ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY
THE INFORMATION THEORETICAL PRIVACY AND
THE IMPACT OF COMMUNICATION CHANNEL ON
INFORMATION THEORETIC PRIVACY
M.Sc. THESIS
Mehmet Özgün DEMI˙R
(504141317)
Electonics and Communication Engineering Department
Telecommunications Engineering Programme
Thesis Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Günes¸ KARABULUT KURT
DECEMBER 2016

I˙STANBUL TEKNI˙K ÜNI˙VERSI˙TESI˙F FEN BI˙LI˙MLERI˙ ENSTI˙TÜSÜ
BI˙LGI˙ KURAMSAL MAHREMI˙YET VE
HABERLES¸ME KANALININ BI˙LGI˙ KURAMSAL MAHREMI˙YETE ETKI˙SI˙
YÜKSEK LI˙SANS TEZI˙
Mehmet Özgün DEMI˙R
(504141317)
Elektronik ve Haberles¸me Mühendislig˘i Anabilim Dalı
Telekomünikasyon Mühendislig˘i Programı
Tez Danıs¸manı: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Günes¸ KARABULUT KURT
ARALIK 2016

Mehmet Özgün DEMI˙R, a M.Sc. student of ITU Graduate School of Science Engi-
neering and Technology 504141317 successfully defended the thesis entitled “THE
INFORMATION THEORETICAL PRIVACY AND THE IMPACT OF COMMUNI-
CATION CHANNEL ON INFORMATION THEORETIC PRIVACY”, which he pre-
pared after fulfilling the requirements specified in the associated legislations, before
the jury whose signatures are below.
Thesis Advisor : Assoc. Prof. Dr. Günes¸ KARABULUT KURT ..............................
Istanbul Technical University
Jury Members : Prof. Dr. Mehmet Ertug˘rul ÇELEBI˙ ..............................
Istanbul Technical University
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ali Emre PUSANE ..............................
Bog˘aziçi University
..............................
Date of Submission : 25 November 2016
Date of Defense : 19 December 2016
v
vi
FOREWORD
My family supported me through all my life, for this reason I would like to thank them
with all my heart. For me, this thesis is also the part of all of their works and they
always deserves the best. I especially would like to thank my advisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr.
Günes¸ Karabulut Kurt for her guidance and wisdom from very beginning until the end
of this thesis. I am also thankful to Prof. Dr. -Ing. Guido Dartmann for his valuable
contributions to this thesis and aids during my abroad year in Germany.
December 2016 Mehmet Özgün DEMI˙R
M.Sc. Student
vii
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD........................................................................................................... vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................ ix
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. xi
SYMBOLS............................................................................................................... xiii
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................. xv
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................xvii
SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. xix
ÖZET ....................................................................................................................... xxi
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1
1.1 Outline of the Thesis ...................................................................................... 3
1.2 Literature Review ........................................................................................... 3
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION................................................................... 9
2.1 Fundamental Concepts from Information Theory.......................................... 9
2.1.1 Entropy, joint entropy, conditional entropy and mutual information ..... 9
2.1.2 Surprise and specific information........................................................... 11
2.1.3 Differential entropy ................................................................................ 13
2.1.4 Markov chains ........................................................................................ 14
2.1.5 Rate Distortion theory ............................................................................ 15
2.2 Quantization and Lloyd’s Algorithm.............................................................. 17
2.3 Kurtosis Analysis............................................................................................ 18
3. PRIVACY MODELS AND APPLICATION SCENARIO.............................. 21
3.1 Source Model.................................................................................................. 21
3.2 Information Theoretic Privacy Measures ....................................................... 24
3.2.1 k-anonymity............................................................................................ 24
3.3 Trade off Between Utility and Privacy ........................................................... 26
3.3.1 System model ......................................................................................... 27
3.3.2 Utility and privacy definitions ................................................................ 28
3.4 Smart City Scenario........................................................................................ 30
4. PRIVACY PRESERVINGWITH k-ANONYMITY........................................ 35
4.1 Attack without Anonymization ...................................................................... 35
4.2 Attack with Anonymization of the ZIP .......................................................... 35
4.3 Attack with Anonymization of the Bluetooth ID ........................................... 37
5. UTILITY PRIVACY TRADE-OFF FOR BINARY SOURCES .................... 41
5.1 Utility Privacy Trade-off for Binary Sources for Joint Effects of Coding
and Channel .................................................................................................... 41
ix
5.2 Utility Privacy Trade-off for Binary Sources for Independent Effects of
Coding and Channel ....................................................................................... 41
5.2.1 Utility and privacy definitions ................................................................ 42
5.2.2 Binary symmetric channel example ....................................................... 43
5.2.3 Numerical results.................................................................................... 44
6. UTILITY PRIVACY TRADE-OFF FOR GAUSSIAN SOURCES................ 49
6.1 Utility Privacy Trade-off for Normally Distributed Attributes for
Databases ....................................................................................................... 49
6.2 Utility Privacy trade-off for Gaussian Sources for Erroneous Channels ....... 51
6.2.1 Utility and privacy definitions ................................................................ 52
6.2.2 Wireless channel with Gaussian noise example ..................................... 53
6.2.3 Numerical results.................................................................................... 54
6.2.4 Statistical results ..................................................................................... 59
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................ 61
REFERENCES........................................................................................................ 65
APPENDICES......................................................................................................... 69
APPENDIX A.1 ................................................................................................... 70
APPENDIX A.2 ................................................................................................... 71
APPENDIX A.3 ................................................................................................... 75
CURRICULUM VITAE......................................................................................... 78
x
ABBREVIATIONS
BSC : Binary Symmetric Channel
DSBS : Doubly Symmetric Binary Source
IoT : Internet of Things
M2M : Machine to Machine
PAM : Pulse Amplitude Modulation
PCM : Pulse Code Modulation
SNR : Signal to Noise Ratio
xi
xii
SYMBOLS
µ : Mean of random variable
s : Standard deviation
r : Correlation coefficient
b2 : Kurtosis coefficient
d : Dirac delta function
n : Number of entries
E[·] : Expected value function
d(·, ·) : Distortion function
H(·) : Entropy function
I(·; ·) : Mutual information function
G(·) : Rate distortion equivocation function
R(·) : Rate distortion function
L(·) : Leakage function
xiii
xiv
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 2.1 :Kurtosis Analysis .................................................................................... 19
Table 3.1 :An example for quasi identifiers, where quasi identifier X denotes the
ZIP codes of individuals. ................................................................... 24
Table 3.2 : 3-anonymity example. Original data and 3-anonymized data are
presented on the left side and on the right side respectively............... 25
Table 4.1 :Original Data SetX ............................................................................... 36
Table 4.2 :Home and Work ZIP Codes are anonymized by using 3 anonymity,
and Bluetooth IDs are anonymized by using 4 anonymity ................. 39
Table 6.1 :Kurtosis Analysis .................................................................................... 59
Table 6.2 :Utility privacy data statistics for different parameters (rXhXr = 0.75) ... 61
xv
xvi
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 2.1:R(D) for binary and Gaussian sources. ................................................. 17
Figure 2.2: Positive kurtosis (on the left side) and negative kurtosis (on the right
side) are compared with b3 = 0, which leads to normal distribution. 19
Figure 3.1: Illustration of quasi identifiers, which is joint data of different
information sources............................................................................. 22
Figure 3.2:The main system structure..................................................................... 27
Figure 3.3:R given on the left side andRD E given on the right side [3] ............. 29
Figure 3.4: Smart city scenario, there are several traffic bluetooth receivers
which provide public safety in general, but they can identify people. 30
Figure 3.5:Application scenarios for utility privacy trade off for different source
models ................................................................................................. 33
Figure 5.1:Transition diagram for the system given in [4] with the cross
probabilities as original (a) and combined version of original (b)...... 42
Figure 5.2:Updated transition diagram for the system given Fig. 3.2 designing
with DSBS and BSC. .......................................................................... 45
Figure 5.3:Combined diagrams of the diagrams given in Fig. 5.2.......................... 46
Figure 5.4:G(D) theoretical upper bounds and simulation results .......................... 47
Figure 5.5:R(D,E) theoretical lower bounds and simulation results ...................... 49
Figure 5.6: L(D) theoretical lower bounds and simulation results .......................... 50
Figure 6.1: System diagrams for normally distributed sources................................ 52
Figure 6.2:G(D) theoretical upper bounds and simulation results .......................... 57
Figure 6.3:R(D,E) theoretical lower bounds and simulation results ...................... 59
Figure 6.4: L(D) theoretical lower bounds and simulation results .......................... 60
xvii
xviii
THE INFORMATION THEORETICAL PRIVACY AND
THE IMPACT OF COMMUNICATION CHANNEL ON
INFORMATION THEORETIC PRIVACY
SUMMARY
With the deployment of the machine to machine (M2M) systems based on Internet
of things (IoT) concept, the amount of the information and its transmission will be
increased dramatically since the new concepts such as smart houses, hospitals or
transportation are integrating to the daily life day by day. In addition to the information
collection and transmission, complex machine learning algorithms, which are fed with
this collected information, will run to guarantee a robust system performance. These
algorithms will run each piece of the information and serve to the end user of the
communication system. But they do not have sufficient information about an important
constraint, which is private information and privacy of individuals. The collected
data also includes private information and it should be not processed using machine
learning algorithms directly. However, this task is not easy to address because of
various definitions of privacy. As a social term, description of privacy is diverse
and can be changed with different perspectives. When information technologies are
considered, different definitions of privacy are already introduced. In this thesis,
privacy is investigated using information theoretic tools because it is well defined to
measure information quantity.
As a first step, k-anonymity, which is one of the first privacy definitions in information
technologies, is chosen as a countermeasure to preserve privacy in one specific smart
city application. This applications is based on localization privacy in smart cities.
The attacks are introduced to violate privacy and k-anonymity is measured. The
results show that k-anonymity satisfies privacy, but it leads decreased data utility
during anonymization. An important issue, which is called the utility privacy trade-off,
should be investigated in wireless communication systems. This trade-off is based on
preserving private attributes about individuals secretly, while utility about the public
attributes, which should be revealed as much as possible, should be satisfied. It should
be noted that both type of these attributes are correlated, as a result privacy leakages of
hidden attributes are possible if public attribute is known. In order to measure utility
and privacy, information theoretic tools are used, while the utility privacy trade-off is
already modeled based on rate distortion theory.
The utility privacy trade-off is already introduced in communication systems and
studied for binary and Gaussian distributed sources. With respect to previous studies,
both utility and privacy are measured based on the distortion level, which results from
coding. However, the impacts of the wireless communication channel are not studied
yet. In this thesis, the utility privacy trade-off functions are investigated based on
the effects of wireless channel in two different application scenarios; smart home and
smart medical scenarios. The first contribution of thesis, the utility privacy trade-off
functions are updated with respect to wireless channel errors in addition to coding
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distortion with the help of rate distortion theory and information theory in general.
Then, the exact updated trade-off functions are derived for the binary valued based on
smart home scenario under the effects of binary symmetric channel and the normally
distributed attributes based on smart medical applications with additional Gaussian
noise respectively. Finally, the derived trade-off functions are justified with numerical
simulations.
This thesis firstly indicates how the anonymization measure can be used in the
communication systems to satisfy privacy for individuals by considering k-anonymity
definition. Due to decreased data utility during anonymization, the utility privacy
trade-off is studied in wireless communication systems. This trade-off is already
studied in communication systems, but the effects of the wireless communication
channel is not deeply investigated yet. For that reason, the impacts of the imperfect
wireless channels are studied and the existing utility privacy trade-off functions are
updated. Then the simulations with respect to updated functions are completed to
justify these functions. Both theoretical analysis and results of simulations show that
distorting effects of wireless channel cause more privacy and less utility. Since the
wireless channel effects are inherently part of a communication systems as well as
coding, the results of these distorting effect on privacy should be carefully inspected.
As future works, further analysis can be done with respect to the utility privacy
trade-off in wireless communications channel. One of the possible research topic
is quantifying the impact of the wireless channel fading on utility privacy trade-off.
It should be expected that the increased fading distortion will lead to more privacy
and less utility, but the theoretical framework and bounds of this future study is quite
promising. Other possible study topic is the effects of the side information on utility
privacy trade-off in case of transmission over erroneous wireless channel. The side
information will possibly cause less privacy for private data and more utility for the end
user. The combination of the anonymization and utility privacy trade-off investigation
can also be considered interesting research subject. The number of corresponding
possible future studies can be increased and also the real life application scenarios and
implementations can be investigated.
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BI˙LGI˙ KURAMSAL MAHREMI˙YET VE
HABERLES¸ME KANALININ BI˙LGI˙ KURAMSAL MAHREMI˙YETE ETKI˙SI˙
ÖZET
Bilgi teknolojilerinin günden güne hızlı gelis¸imi düs¸ünüldüg˘ünde, bireylere ait bilginin
toplanması ve iletimi de s¸eylerin interneti (IoT) tanımına uygun olacak s¸ekilde aynı
hızla artmaktadır. Bu tanım altında yer alan makineden makineye (M2M) haberles¸me
sistemleri de bireyler hakkında toplanan bilgilerin çog˘unun kaynag˘ıdır. Bu bilgilerin
toplanmasındaki temel amaç, cihazların çalıs¸ma verimlilig˘ini artırarak bireylere daha
yüksek konfor sag˘lamaktır. Toplanan bilgi iteratif yöntemler kullanılarak makine
ög˘renme algoritmaları tarafından is¸lenir ve algoritma çıkıs¸ları güncel tutularak kararlar
iyiles¸tirir. Bireyler hakkındaki bilgilerin toplanması ve is¸lenmesi as¸amalarında ise
önemli bir konu henüz telsiz haberles¸me sistemleri için yeteri kadar incelenmemis¸tir.
Tüm bu bilgi miktarı düs¸ünüldüg˘ünde, aynı zamanda mahrem bilgiler de ayırt
edilmeden toplanmakta ve sistemler içerisinde is¸lenmektedir, ve bu tüm bireyler için
kabul edilemez bir durumdur. Bu tez kapsamında telsiz haberles¸me sistemlerindeki
mahremiyet konusu ele alınmıs¸ ve özellikle telsiz haberles¸me kanallarının bozucu
etkilerinin mahremiyete olan etkisi incelenmis¸tir.
Mahremiyet kelimesinin tanımı öncelikle sosyal bilimler alanında tartıs¸ılmıs¸, ve
mahremiyet tanımı olarak farklı öneriler getirilmis¸tir. Günümüzde de buna ek
olarak bilgi teknojilerinin gelis¸imiyle beraber, mahremiyet tanımı bu alan için de
bir aras¸tırma konusu olmus¸tur. Sosyal bilimciler tarafından yayımlanan çalıs¸malarda
yer alan mahremiyet tanımları genis¸ kapsamlı, birbirinden oldukça farklı ve çog˘u
zaman bilgi teknolojilerine aktarılması oldukça zordur. Bu sebeple mahremiyetin
bilgi teknolojileri çerçevesinde ayrıca tanımları yapılmıs¸tır. Bu tanımlardan biri olan
k-anonimlik bu tez kapsamında detaylıca incelenmis¸ olup, tez içerisinde düs¸ünülen
3 uygulama senaryosundan biri baz alınarak deg˘endirilmis¸tir. Ancak k-anonimlig˘in
de dahil oldug˘u bu tanımlar da oldukça farklı olup, çog˘unun kullanım alanı belli
uygulamalarla sınırlıdır. Ayrıca çog˘u çalıs¸ma sadece mahremiyeti sag˘lamakla
ilgilenmis¸ ve mahremiyeti sag˘larken verinin içerisindeki faydayı büyük ölçüde göz ardı
etmis¸tir. Burada fayda ve mahremiyet kavramlarının arasındaki ilis¸ki incelenmis¸ ve
aralarında bir ödünles¸im ortaya çıkarılmıs¸tır. Bu ödünles¸im de farklı kaynak tipleri için
modellenmis¸ ve tez kapsamındaki dig˘er 2 senaryo da fayda mahremiyet ödünles¸imi
temelinde incelenmis¸tir.
k-anonimlik tanımına göre, yarı tanımlıyıcı olarak adlandırılan nitelik grubunun
anonim veride en az k defa bulunması gerekmetedir. Yarı tanımlayıcı niteliklerin
özellikleri, mahremiyet saldırganlarının farklı bilgi kaynaklarından bu tip nitekleri
kars¸ılas¸tırarak, bireyleri tanımlayabilmesi imkanı vermesidir. Örnekle açıklamak
gerekirse, açık kaynaklarda bulunan bir özgeçmis¸deki yas¸ ve adres bilgileri, anonim
bir s¸ekilde yayınlanmıs¸ tıp verisindeki aynı bilgilerle kars¸ılas¸tırılırsa, özgeçmis¸in
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sahibi bireyin hassas tıp bilgilerine ulas¸ılabilir. Bu durumda adres ve yas¸ tipi bilgiler
yarı tanımlayıcı olarak sınıflandırılabilir. k-anonimlik tanımının çalıs¸ıldıg˘ı uygulama
senaryosundan da bahsetmek gerekir. Bu senaryo temelde bir akıllı s¸ehir senaryosuna
göre uyarlanmıs¸tır. Bu tip bir akıllı s¸ehirde, trafik ıs¸ıkları veya tabelalarında yer alan
Bluetooth alıcılar ile trafik ihlallerini saptamak, trafik yog˘unlug˘unun gerçek zamanlı
olarak kullanıcılara iletilmesi ve trafik ıs¸ıklarının bu yog˘unlug˘a göre zamanlanması
gibi kullanım alanları belirlenmis¸tir. Bu tez içerisindeki senaryoda Bluetooth tabanlı
bu sistemin çalıs¸ması için araçlar içerisinde de Bluetooth etiketler bulunmalıdır.
Saldırgan bir Bluetooth alıcı ile bu araçlardaki Bluetooth etiketleri anlık olarak takip
edebilir. Düs¸ünülen saldırılara göre evden is¸e gitmekte olan bireylerin araçlarında
Bluetooth etiketler yol boyunca izlenmis¸tir. Bu saldırı sonucunda, isim bilgisi
olmadan s¸irket çalıs¸anlarının ev adresi ve ev-is¸ arası yol güzergahı ög˘renilmis¸tir.
Sonraki saldırı da, saldırgan açık kaynaklar yardımıyla s¸irket çalıs¸anlarının isimlerini
ög˘renebilmektedir. Bu açık kaynaklara örnek olarak büyük bir enstitütünün internet
sitesi gösterilebilir. En son saldırı da ise, ög˘renilen bu isimlerin adresleri ve telefon
numaraları telefon rehberi gibi açık kaynaklar yardımıyla ög˘renilebilir. Tüm bu ataklar
sonucunda kis¸ilerin, adresleri, is¸yeri adresleri ve yol güzergahı gibi bilgilerin tamamı
ög˘renilir. Bu ataklara kars¸ı olarak k-anonimlik hem Bluetooth numaraları hem de
posta kodları kapsamında ayrı ayrı kullanılmıs¸ ve mahremiyeti korumada bas¸arılı
oldug˘u gözlenmis¸tir. Ancak dog˘al olarak sebep oldug˘u faydalı bilginin kaybına dikkat
edilmelidir. Bu sebeple tezin ileri kısımlarında fayda mahremiyet ödünles¸im tanımı
haberles¸me sistemleri için incelenmis¸tir.
Fayda mahremiyet ödünles¸imin detaylarını açıklamadan önce bilgi kaynag˘ı modelini
belirtmekte yarar var. Bu modele göre, bireylerle ilgili bilgiler toplandıktan sonra
temelde ikiye ayrılabilirler; biri bireyler hakkındaki mahrem nitelik (isim, vergi
numarası, konum) dig˘eri de bireyler hakkındaki aleni nitelik (servis sag˘layacı için
gerekli fatura bilgileri, araç hızı). Bu sınıflandırmaya göre, mahrem nitelig˘in
olabilidig˘ince gizli kalması istenirken, aleni nitelig˘in de fayda fonksiyonu için en iyi
s¸ekilde iletilmesi ve is¸lenmesi beklenir. Buradaki aleni nitelikler, sistemin tasarımına
ve çalıs¸ma s¸ekline göre kullanıcı ya da sistem sag˘layıcı tarafından önem arz eder. Yine
bilgi kaynag˘ı modeline göre bu iki tip nitelik birbiriyle bag˘lantılı olabilir. Örneg˘in,
konum ile hız ya da evdeki cihazların çalıs¸ma durumu ile evde birinin olup olmaması
gibi. Bu niteliklerin birbiriyle bag˘lantılı olma durumu da bir mahremiyet riskini
ortaya çıkarır, çünkü aleni nitelig˘i bilen bir kis¸i ya da sistem aynı zamanda belli bir
ilis¸kilendirme modeline göre bireyin mahrem nitelig˘i hakkında da büyük oranda fikir
sahibi olur.
Açıklanan kaynak modeline göre, fayda mahremiyet tanımı daha rahat yapılabilir.
Temelde fayda ölçütü aleni nitelig˘i temel alarak ölçerken, mahremiyet ölçütü de
mahrem nitelig˘in miktarını baz alır. Bu iki ölçüt ise var olan ilis¸ki fonsiyonundan
dolayı birbirine zıt biçimde gözlenir. Faydanın en yüksek oldug˘u durum aleni bilginin
tam anlamıyla açıg˘a vurulması sonucunda ortaya çıkarken bu durumda mahremiyet
minimumdadır. Tam tersi durumda ise aleni bilgi meydana çıkarılmaz ve mahrem
bilgiye eris¸im olanag˘ı kalmaz, bu sayede de mahremiyet en üst, fayda ise en alt
düzeydedir. Haberles¸me sistemleri özelinde bu iki mahrem ve aleni nitelig˘in iletimi ve
sistem içerisinde bozulma miktarları, fayda mahremiyet ödünles¸imi ile açıklanabilir.
Tez kapsamında düs¸ünülen telsiz haberles¸me sisteminde, mahrem nitelik kaynak
tarafından dıs¸a çıkarılmaz ve sistem üzerinde iletilmez. Aleni nitelik ise önce kodlanır,
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ardından olus¸an kod sözcükleri telsiz haberles¸me kanalını kullanarak alıcıya ulas¸ır.
Alıcıda kod çözme is¸lemi yapıldıktan sonra aleni nitelig˘in özellikleri incelenebilir. Tez
kapsamında incelenen mahremiyet ölçütü, sistem çıkıs¸ındaki aleni nitelig˘e bakılarak
mahrem nitelik hakkında ne kadar bilgi edinildig˘i fikrine göre tanımlanmıs¸tır. Fayda
ölçütü ise sistem çıkıs¸ındaki aleni nitelig˘in, kaynak tarafından sistemin giris¸ine
yollanan aleni nitelig˘e ne kadar yakın olmasıyla belirlenir.
Fayda mahremiyet ödünles¸imi hakkında haberles¸me sistemlerinde yapılan çalıs¸malar
incelendig˘inde, var olan çalıs¸maların farklı kaynak biçimleri için bu ödünles¸imi
analiz ettikleri görülmüs¸tür. Bu yayınlarda, fayda ve mahremiyet bilgi kuramı
temelli araçlarla ölçülürken, var olan ödünles¸im de bilgi kuramını temel alan hız
bozunum teorisi ile açıklanmıs¸tır. Ele alınan kaynak biçimleri arasında ikili deg˘er
alabilen kaynaklar ve normal dag˘ılıma sahip kaynaklar bas¸lıca incelenmis¸tir. Ancak
bu çalıs¸maların içerisinde ödünles¸im üzerindeki telsiz haberles¸me kanalının bozucu
etkileri incelenmemis¸tir. Bu tez kapsamında, fayda mahremiyet ödünles¸imi ikili
deg˘erler alabilen ve normal dag˘ılıma sahip kaynaklar kullanılarak telsiz kanalların
bozucu etkileri göz önüne alınarak incelenmis¸tir. Bas¸lıca katkılar açıklanacak olursa,
en temelde fayda ve mahremiyet ödünles¸im fonksiyonlarının kaynak dag˘ılımı ve
kodlama kaynaklı bozunumlara ek olarak telsiz haberles¸me kanalının bozucu etkilerine
de bag˘lı bir fonksiyon oldug˘u önerilmis¸tir. Bu önerim sonrasında, güncellenen
fonksiyon tanımı ikili deg˘er alabilen ve normal dag˘ılımlı nitelikler için matematiksel
olarak ayrı ayrı türetilmis¸tir. Elde edilen fonskiyon ifadelerin dog˘rulug˘u sonrasında da
simulasyonlar ile onaylanmıs¸tır.
Öncelikle ikili deg˘erler alabilen kaynaklar, uygulama senaryolarının ikincisi altında
deg˘erlendirilmis¸tir. Bu senaryoya göre akıllı ev veya ofisler içerisindeki cihazlar,
mevcut çalıs¸ma durumlarını M2M sistemler çerçevesinde kullanıcılara ya da servis
sag˘layıcılara iletirler. Çalıs¸ma durumları olarak ikili durumlar (açık/kapalı gibi)
seçilmis¸ o sebeple ikili deg˘er alabilien sistemler için uygun bir senaryo oldug˘u
düs¸ünülmüs¸tür. Bu senaryo kapsamında, cihazın çalıs¸ma durumu kullanıcı veya
servis sag˘layıcı için faydayı belirtir. Cihazın çalıs¸ma durumuyla ilis¸kili o ortamda
birinin olup olmaması ise mahremiyet kapsamında deg˘erlendirilir. Öngörülebileceg˘i
gibi cihazın (havalandırma sistemi, güvenlik sistemi) çalıs¸ma durumu ile ortamda
birinin olup olmaması biribiriyle açıkça ilis¸kilidir. I˙kili deg˘erler alabilen nitelikler
kapsamında, fayda mahremiyet ödünles¸im tanımı matematiksel olarak güncellenmis¸tir
ve simulasyonlarla güncel fonksiyon ifadesinin dog˘rulug˘u onaylanmıs¸tır. Bu fayda
mahremiyet ödünles¸im fonksiyonlarına göre, telsiz haberles¸me kanalının bozucu
etkileri kodlama bozunumuna ek olarak ayrı bir bozunum yapar. Dolayısıyla bu
bozunum aleni nitelik için faydayı düs¸ürürken, mahrem nitelik için mahremiyeti
arttırır.
Normal dag˘ılımlı nitelikler de fayda mahremiyet ödünles¸imi bas¸lıg˘ı altında
incelenmis¸tir. Bu esnada ikili deg˘erler alabilen niteliklerde oldug˘u gibi bir uygulama
senaryosu düs¸ünülmüs¸tür. I˙ncelenen bu üçüncü ve son senaryoda, akıllı tıbbi sistemler
senaryo bas¸lıg˘ı olarak belirlenmis¸tir. Bu tip sistemlerde hastaların anlık sag˘lık
durumları telsiz haberles¸me sistemleri ve sensör ag˘ları kullanılarak hastanın doktoruna
iletilmektedir ve ciddi bir mahremiyet koruması içermelidir. Tez içerisindeki
senaryoya göre, hastaların anlık tıbbi durumu (kan basıncı, kalp ritmi gibi) doktorlara
iletilmelidir ve bu fayda ölçütünün kriteridir. Ancak bu tıbbi bilgiler, hastanın
yas¸ıyla, cinsiyetiyle, boyu ve kilosuyla da aynı zamanda ilis¸kilidir. Dolayısıyla
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saldırgan, elde ettig˘i bu tıbbi bilgileri ve bu bilgilerin hasta özellikleriyle alakalı
ilis¸ki modeli kullanarak, kurumlar tarafından anonim hasta adıyla yayınlanan sag˘lık
verilerine ulas¸abilir. Bu verilerden hastaya ait daha detaylı bilgilere ulas¸arak
hasta mahremiyetini ihlal edebilir. Bu senaryo kapsamında, kan basıncı ve yas¸
gibi deg˘erlerin normal dag˘ılımı ile modellenebileceg˘i öngörülmüs¸tür. Bu s¸ekilde
yapılan ödünles¸im çalıs¸malarında, normal dag˘ılıma uygun biçimde fayda mahremiyet
ödünles¸im fonksiyonları telsiz haberles¸me kanalının bozucu etkilerini de kapsayacak
s¸ekilde güncellenmis¸tir. Ardından bu güncel fonksiyonlar, simulasyonlar ile test
edilmis¸ ve dog˘rulug˘u belirlenmis¸tir. Çıkan sonuçlara göre kanal gürültüsünün
gücü arttıkça sistemdeki bozunum artıyor, ve akabinde mahremiyet artarken fayda
düs¸ünüyor.
Telsiz haberles¸me sistemleri için mahremiyet konusunun is¸lendig˘i bu tez kapsamında,
öncelikle çes¸itli mahremiyet tanımları incelenmis¸ ve ilk olarak sisteme aktarılması
uygun olan k-anonimlik tanımı gerçeklenmis¸tir. Yapılan gerçekleme sonucunda,
k-anonimlig˘in mahremiyeti sag˘lamak için uygun oldug˘u ancak bir dig˘er önemli ifade
olan faydayı da önemli biçimde düs¸ürdüg˘ü ortaya çıkmıs¸tır. Dolayısıyla fayda
mahremiyet ödünles¸imi de önem kazanmıs¸ ve tez kapsamında farklı tipte nitelikler
için aras¸tırılmıs¸tır. Bu esnada telsiz haberles¸me kanalının bozucu etkileri de var
olan ödünles¸im fonksiyonlarına eklenmis¸tir. Ortaya çıkan fonksiyonların dog˘rulug˘u
simulasyonlar ile onaylanmıs¸tır. Sonuçlara göre telsiz haberles¸me kanalının bozucu
etkileri sistemdeki bozunumu artırarak mahremiyeti arttırıcı ve faydayı azaltırıcı bir
etken olarak gözlenmis¸tir.
Bu konu hakkında yapılabilecek ileriki çalıs¸malarda fayda mahremiyet ödünles¸imi
telsiz haberles¸me konuları kapsamında daha genis¸ bir biçimde incelenebilir.
Olası çalıs¸ma alanlarından biri, kanalın sönümleme etkisinin bu ödünles¸ime olan
etkisini incelemektir. Muhtemel sonuçlar düs¸ünüldüg˘ünde, artan bir sönümlemenin
mahremiyeti arttıracag˘ı ve faydayı düs¸üreceg˘i tahmin edilebilir. Yine de bu
kapsamda bir çalıs¸ma yapılması durumunda, sönümlemenin teorik etkilerinin literatüre
kazandırılması büyük önem tas¸ır. Fayda mahremiyet ödünles¸imi hakkında bir
dig˘er olası çalıs¸ma konusu da yan bilginin telsiz haberles¸me sistem parametreleri
düs¸ünülerek, fayda mahremiyet ödünles¸imine etkisinin incelenmesidir. Yan bilginin
telsiz haberles¸me sistemleri kapsamındaki olası etkisi de mahremiyeti düs¸ürmek ve
faydayı arttırmak olabilir. Düs¸ünülebilecek bir dig˘er ihtimal ise, fayda mahremiyet
ödünles¸im incelemesinin anonimite ile beraber göz önüne alınmasıdır. Var olabilecek
tüm senaryolar ayrıca mevcut ve gelis¸tirilecek sistemler için gerçeklenmelidir ve bu da
genis¸ bir inceleme alanıdır.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With the development of new systems based on the term Internet of things (IoT), state
of art communication devices are seen in each part of the daily life. The devices are
responsible to supply better and easier daily life for people, thereby they need to collect
more information about individuals as well as to increase the connectivity among each
other. These needs lead to a mass of information collection and data transmission.
In addition, this collected information will be processed with highly capable machine
learning algorithms in future deployments. These algorithms are feed with information
about individuals and they iteratively improve their decisions. However there is a very
high risk about data privacy, since the collected information also includes their private
information. Without any privacy preserving guarantee, they should not be a part of
the daily life. In general, privacy is an ethics concept and it should not be negotiable in
best case. According to [5], the current systems leak private information in many cases
and a reform in privacy-preserving systems is needed due to the state of art information
technological developments, which easily creates opportunities for the surveillance of
a person. Today, identical information of billions of people is stored in databases
and data traffic is increasing day by day by using sensor networks and machine to
machine communication (M2M) techniques. The observed information, such as daily
commuting route, favorite restaurants or electricity usage can be used to violate the
privacy of an individual. In such scenarios, the problem is the definition of privacy and
the question is identification of the private information.
As privacy has various definitions in both social sciences and information technologies,
it is hard to quantify privacy globally. In one theory about privacy definitions in
information technologies, an umbrella definition should be used to understand privacy
with information technological perspective, owing to various privacy definitions [5].
With the information technological perspective, information theoretic functions are
suitable tools to study privacy because they are well defined in literature and give
the theoretical bounds of corresponding privacy functions. One of the first proposed
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privacy definitions is k-anonymity. This method aims to preserve private information
in databases and in different information sources, which has same shape as databases.
Even though k-anonymity is not defined with information theoretic tools, it can be
measured with these tools with respect to the expressions in [6]. However, it will be
seen in the rest of the thesis that k-anonymity is not the best option to study privacy in
wireless communication systems due to inconsideration of data utility and being not
feasible for communication systems. Based on this fact, the relationship between the
utility and privacy is investigated, and this relation is called the utility privacy trade-off.
Based on this trade-off, understanding privacy is not only concern since the utility of
data sources, which is relevant with the usability of the data, should be taken into
account in system privacy preserving system designs.
Before explaining the utility privacy trade-off, the considered source model should
be briefly explained. In the source model, the individuals are the data sources, and
they have both private (hidden) and public attributes. The public attributes should be
revealed as much as possible to increase utility, while the hidden attributes should be
secretly kept out to satisfy privacy. Moreover these attributes may be correlated with
each other. This correlation creates privacy leakages in systems, because the hidden
attribute can be guessed with high accuracy if the public attribute and the correlation
model are known. This trade-off is based on the idea, which there is no privacy
leakage if the public attribute reveals perfectly. On the other hand, there will be no
data utility if the public attribute is not released. These two extreme cases are called;
perfect utility and perfect privacy. In order to measure privacy and utility, information
theoretic measures are used (e.g. conditional entropy, mutual information). In addition,
the rate distortion theory is also very useful to understand the trade-off since this
theory is already applied in communication systems and the distortion measure, which
underlies the measurement of utility and privacy. The utility privacy trade-off functions
are introduced in [4] as a source coding problem with additional privacy constraints
based on the rate distortion theory. In the same study, the examples based on binary
sources are given. Then, these functions are studied for normally distributed sources
in [3]. Even though there are many research about the utility privacy trade-off in
2
literature, this trade-off is not investigated deeply based on the impacts of the wireless
communications environment.
1.1 Outline of the Thesis
In this thesis, firstly k-anonymity privacy preserving methods will be explained and
the examples of k-anonymity is studied with a smart city scenario, which is based on
location privacy, in Chapter 4. After that the utility privacy trade-off in a wireless
communication system including the effects of the wireless channel are investigated.
In that part, the utility privacy trade-off functions are updated for erroneous wireless
channels. Finally, these updated functions are justified with the numerical examples for
both discrete sources and continuous sources respectively. In Chapter 5, the updated
utility privacy trade-off functions is explained for a smart home scenario, where the
smart devices send their binary working mode (e.g. on/off mode) to user through
central base station. Since there are only two possible modes in determined application
scenario, the utility privacy trade-off is investigated for binary valued attributes under
the effects of noisy channel. Then in Chapter 6, the utility privacy trade-off expressions
are performed for another smart city scenario, which origins from the smart medicine
and body sensor networks. Both hidden and public attributes are distributed normally
since the data in this medical scenarios can be considered correlated and normally
distributed (e.g. height-weight relation and distribution). In conclusion, these privacy
metrics are summarized and discussed for possible implementation or more complex
scenarios.
1.2 Literature Review
In order to understand the meaning of privacy deeply, both social and mathematical
definitions of privacy are discussed in this thesis. With this goal, major privacy
definitions in the social sciences are given firstly. In social sciences, various definitions
of privacy such as right to be let alone [7], limited access [8], self-determination [9],
privacy as secrecy are proposed. Another important point about privacy in social
sciences is the co-ownership, which means that the second person is the co-owner of
the private information if the owner of the information shares his private information
with this second person [10]. Here, the trust problem may be encountered. Moreover,
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the assumption is that the second person, which is the receiver in a communication
network, is completely trustful. But implementation of these various definitions in
information technological environment can be problematic. When self-determination
idea is considered, an encryption scheme is proposed in [11] for the cloud systems
based on the self-determination definition. Besides it is obvious that privacy is closely
related with secrecy based on the informational technological perspective if privacy as
secrecy definition is considered. However these two concepts are distinct. Research
on secrecy has a long history and the information theoretic foundations are firstly
presented in 1949 by the seminal work of Shannon [12]. In secrecy, it is desired that
specific information can not be received by eavesdroppers [3]. On the other hand,
privacy protection should guarantee not to provide extra information in addition to
the background information of the eavesdropper when it can access to the revealed
information [13]. For the same reason, the goal in the secrecy scenario is to prevent
to capturing the information from the external third parties, while the eavesdropper
is also the part of the system in the privacy problem [14]. As a result of these
complexities, the authors in [5] defend that an umbrella definition can be proposed
for better understanding of privacy with information technological manner owing to
the various definitions of privacy.
Privacy issues are becoming essential with the development of new systems such as
M2M communication systems where any type of information can be reached and
shared very easily. But before making any other privacy studies, the privacy constraints
and the source models should be clearly understood. In informational technologies,
the well-known privacy challenges (e.g authentication and identity management,
trust management, data protection) should be considered in the system designs [15].
Otherwise, surveillance and Orwellian facts are inevitable with the development of
smart devices. In [16], the authors showed that uniqueness of some type of data sets
is high and reproducible with outside information. As a result of this paper, it leads
to important privacy threats. In most of the privacy preserving papers, the data is
categorized into different types such as identifier (e.g. name), quasi-identifiers (e.g.
postal code, age) [17] in order to find out which type of data should be keep in secret
and which type of data should be send to the receiver. According to [3], working with
databases should be the first step because they are well studied and highly structured.
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As explained before, one of the first privacy definitions is k-anonymity, which
indicates that for a large k, each entry should be identical from (k-1) other entries
[18]. Later, possible attacks to k-anonymity are investigated in [19], where they
introduce l-diversity. The definition of l-diversity is based on equivalence class
definition. The sensitive attribute, which should be kept in private, should have
at least l "well represented" values to make an equivalence class to l-diverse.
Following these, t-closeness is proposed in [20] and it guarantees more privacy than
l-diversity approach. As an application dependent paper, Q&S diversity, which is
one of the specified version of l diversity, is used as privacy metric for preserving
privacy in databases [21]. Another problem about k anonymity, which is the
effects of dimensionality in k anonymity, is studied in [22]. All of these privacy
definitions are application specific. The first universal definition of privacy for the
databases and data mining applications is differential privacy. According to the
definition of differential privacy, two databases D1 and D2 should differ at most one
element and a function K gives differential privacy for the databases D1 and D2
databases, then S ✓ Range(K) with relation Pr[K(D1) 2 S]  exp(e)⇥Pr[K(D2) 2
S] [23, 24]. Due to the theoretic and complex definition of differential privacy to
compute, new computational privacy definitions, which are "Indistinguishability based
computational differential privacy (IND-CDP)" and "Simulation based computational
differential privacy (SIM-CDP)", are proposed on the differential privacy definition
and computational system environment [25].
The mentioned definitions are mostly based on the privacy concerns, but privacy should
be considered with the data utility with respect to utility privacy trade-off. One of the
pioneer study based on the utility privacy trade-off is [4], and as explained before, the
authors investigate this trade-off as a source coding problem with respect to privacy
constraints. This paper shows that this problem can be associated with rate-distortion
theory. In the same paper, the authors introduce the utility privacy functions, which
are the rate distortion equivocation function and the distortion equivocation function,
and show relevant regions of these functions for a communication system. In [3], it is
shown that the rate distortion equivocation region, which is found in [4], is equal to the
utility privacy trade off region. In the same study, a general source model is created
for the utility-privacy trade off region, and a database structure is chosen as this source
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model. This study is extended in the [26] with the wide approach for side information
cases. Also in [27], the utility privacy trade-off is considered on databases and some
examples from different privacy categories (e.g. smart meter privacy, competitive
privacy) are given. In this area, side information and source coding problems are very
important, and [14] is very useful to understand most significant studies with its wide
investigation areas about the utility privacy trade-off subject.
In the communication network, different types of privacy-preserving problems (e.g
location privacy, sensitive medical data) are still on investigation. In Chapter 4, the
smart city scenarios are explained in details for different system and source models
(e.g. k-anonymity, utility privacy trade-off). In Chapter 4, the location privacy
issues are discussed by using k-anonymity since the location privacy is an important
application area of privacy preserving researches. Also, the location privacy is a very
important issue especially for the vehicular communication systems [28]. In [29], the
authors explained these researches deeply with a survey paper. Moreover, the location
privacy preserving mechanisms are investigated based on different techniques such
as k-anonymity, precision reducing and location hiding in [30]. In another, location
privacy preserving research, the Shannon entropy used as a information metric by
using an indoor localizing system "Active Bat" [31]. Other important privacy area
is the smart grid technologies [32]. In [33], which is based on the studies done in
thesis and published during the thesis studies, the authors studied the k-anonymity in a
smart city scenario, which is based on Bluetooth tracking. Beyond the communication
systems, privacy in the cloud computing area is another popular part, because these
technologies will play an important role in the IoT concept [17].
In the literature, the privacy preserving studies in communication systems are mostly
heuristic and application dependent. In addition, the effects of the wireless channel is
not deeply investigated in the publications about privacy preserving communication
systems. For that reason, a theoretical framework of privacy with respect to the
elements of wireless communication systems, such as wireless transmission errors,
distortion and channel noises, should be clarified. In order to cover this gap in the
literature, this thesis presents a theoretical analysis of the wireless communication
networks with the privacy concerns, which are highly correlated with the data utility.
The main contribution of this thesis is that the utility privacy trade-off is investigated
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for the wireless communication systems while the impacts of the wireless channel
on the trade-off is taken into account. In order to achieve wide representation of
various numerical data types, both discrete and continuously distributed sources are
considered in the utility privacy trade-off investigations. To the best of our knowledge
about the utility privacy trade-off publications, this thesis presents pioneer framework
of the utility privacy trade-off with respect to impacts of the wireless communication
channel.
7
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2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Before considering the effects of channel on privacy or utility definitions, some of
the fundamental concepts should be explained. This chapter contains relevant part of
the information theoretic foundations including rate distortion theory for discrete and
continuous random variables. Moreover, the determined optimum quantization scheme
for continuous random variables, which is the Lloyd’s Algorithm and the measure of
resemblance to a Gaussian distribution of a random variable, which is the Kurtosis
analysis are given in this chapter.
2.1 Fundamental Concepts from Information Theory
Utility and privacy can be measured with information theoretic approaches since
well-studied information theoretic tools let us to measure the information transfer by
using entropy and mutual information definitions in wireless communication systems.
In this manner, amount of the distortion between random variables and data disclosure
can be understood with information theory. Furthermore, the utility privacy trade-off
is closely related with rate distortion theory, which is a subtopic of information theory.
Thereby, there are many different privacy metrics, e.g. k-anonymity, have already
defined by using considered information theoretic tools.
2.1.1 Entropy, joint entropy, conditional entropy and mutual information
The information theory is one of the most important principles of the communication
systems and this theory provides insights about many distinct aspects of data
transmission. As a main component, definition of entropy given as follows [1]:
Definition 2.1.1. Entropy: The entropy is defined as a measure of uncertainty of the
random variable X and expressed in (2.1), while p(x) is defined as the probability mass
function of X, as follows:
H(X)⌘  Â
x2X
p(x) log(p(x)). (2.1)
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In this thesis, log(·) functions use with base 2 except anything on the opposite is
indicated. In addition to entropy definition for one random variable, joint entropy
is defined for two or more random variables as [1]:
Definition 2.1.2. Joint Entropy: For pair of discrete random variables X and Y , which
have a joint distribution p(x,y), the joint entropy H(X ,Y ) is expressed as [1]:
H(X ,Y )⌘  Â
x2X
Â
y2Y
p(x,y) log(p(x,y)). (2.2)
In case of more than two random variables, same expression can be extended with
more summation for a given joint distribution such that [1]:
H(X ,Y, · · · ,Q)⌘  Â
x2X
Â
y2Y
· · · Â
q2Q
p(x,y, · · · ,q) log(p(x,y, · · · ,q)). (2.3)
The conditional entropy, which represents the entropy of a random variable in case of
known another random variable, is defined as follows [1]:
Definition 2.1.3. Conditional Entropy: When the random variable Y is known,
the conditional entropy of random variable X is based on conditional probability
distribution p(x|y) and is defined as:
H(X |Y )⌘  Â
x2X
Â
y2Y
p(x,y) log(p(x|y)). (2.4)
The relationship between entropy, joint entropy and conditional entropy can be
explained with a powerful tool called chain rule. This rule can be written for two
and three random variables as follows [1]:
H(X ,Y ) = H(X |Y )+H(Y ) (2.5)
H(X ,Y,Z) = H(X ,Y |Z)+H(Z) (2.6)
= H(X |Y,Z)+H(Y,Z) (2.7)
= H(X |Y,Z)+H(Y |Z)+H(Z). (2.8)
Another basic information theoretic expression is Kullback-Leibler distance [1], which
is necessary to understand information disclosure about random variables, and its
definition given in followings [1]:
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Definition 2.1.4. Kullback Leibler (KL) distance: Kullback Leibler (KL) distance
indicates the relative entropy (distance) between two probability mass functions p(x)
and q(x) and it is defined as:
D(p||q) = Â
x2X
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
. (2.9)
Kullback-Leibler distance is necessary to define mutual information, which is a
measure of the amount of information between two random variables. The mutual
information explains that the uncertainty about one random variable is reduced with
the knowledge of other random variable. The definition of mutual information is given
as follows [1]:
Definition 2.1.5. Mutual Information: For given two random variables X and Y with
joint probability mass function p(x,y) and marginal probability mass functions p(x)
and p(y), mutual information is defined as the Kullback-Leibler distance between joint
distribution and product distribution as follows:
I(X ;Y ) = D(p(x,y)||p(x)p(y))
= Â
x2X
Â
y2Y
p(x,y) log
p(x,y)
p(x)p(y)
. (2.10)
Moreover, the mutual information can be also expressed in terms of entropy (2.1):
I(X ;Y ) = H(Y ) H(Y |X) (2.11)
= H(X) H(X |Y ) (2.12)
= H(X)+H(Y ) H(X ,Y ). (2.13)
2.1.2 Surprise and specific information
The surprise (or j-measure) is defined as the single symbol contribution of the mutual
information [6]. The mutual information in terms of the Kullback-Leibler distance is
the average value of the surprise in terms of X . It is given as the relative distance
between the distribution p(y) and the conditional distribution p(y|x).
Definition 2.1.6. Surprise [6]: The j-measure is defined as the Kullback-Leibler
distance between the marginal distribution p(y) and the conditional distribution
p(y|x):
I1(x,Y ) = D(p(y|x)||p(y)). (2.14)
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Corollary 1. If (2.14) is compared with (2.10), it can be seen that:
I(X ;Y ) = Â
x2X
p(x)I1(x,Y ). (2.15)
Hence, the mutual information can be seen as the average surprise. On the other
side, the average value of the specific information or i-measure equals to the mutual
information in terms of entropy.
Definition 2.1.7. Specific information [6]: The i-measure is defined as the reduction of
entropy between the marginal distribution p(y) and the conditional probability p(y|x):
I2(x,Y ) = H(Y ) H(Y |x). (2.16)
Corollary 2. It can be easily seen that the mutual information is average specific
information such that:
I(X ;Y ) = Â
x2X
p(x)I2(x,Y ).
Proof.
I(X ;Y ) = Â
x2X
p(x) Â
y2Y
p(y) log(p(y))  Â
x2X
p(x)H(Y |x),
where I(X ;Y ) = Âx2X p(x)I2(x,Y ) owing to Âx2X p(x) = 1.
As a result of Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, mutual information is the average of both
metrics (I1(x,Y ) and I2(x,Y )), but does it mean that I1(x,Y ) = I2(x,Y )? The surprise is
written for a given X = x based on (2.14):
I1(x,Y ) = Â
y2Y
p(y|x) log p(y|x)
p(y)
=  Â
y2Y
p(y|x)p(y) log 
 
  Â
y2Y
p(y|x) log(p(y|x))
!
=  Â
y2Y
p(y|x)p(y) log H(Y |x), (2.17)
and by using the specific information definition (2.16):
I2(x,Y ) =  Â
y2Y
p(y)p(y) log H(Y |x). (2.18)
As a result of (2.17) and (2.18), both measures are equivalent only in average.
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2.1.3 Differential entropy
According to the definition of entropy, well known entropy function H(·) is defined for
discrete and binary random variables. For continuous case, we should use differential
entropy h(·) which is given in the following definition.
Definition 2.1.8. Differential Entropy: For a continuous random variable X with
probability density function f (x), the differential entropy h(X) is defined as [1]:
h(X) = 
Z
S
f (x) log f (x)dx, (2.19)
where S is the domain of the random variable. For continuously distributed random
variable X, the differential entropy of X equals to:
h(X) 1
2
log2pes2. (2.20)
The equality can be satisfied only for normally distributed random variable X ⇠
N (0,s2).
Similar to the joint entropy and conditional entropy definitions given in (2.2), (2.3)
and (2.4), joint and conditional differential entropy are explained respectively in the
following definitions.
Definition 2.1.9. Joint Differential Entropy: For the set of random variables
X1,X2, . . . ,Xn with density function f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn), the differential entropy is defined
as [1]:
h(X1,X2, . . . ,Xn) = 
Z
f (xn) log f (xn)dxn. (2.21)
The entropy of random variables X1,X2, . . . ,Xn with joint continuous distribution with
mean µ and covariance matrix K equals:
h(X1,X2, · · · ,Xn) 12 log(2pe)
n|K|, (2.22)
where |K| is the determinant of K. The equality can be provided only X1,X2, · · · ,Xn ⇠
h(Nn(µ,K)) multivariate normal distribution with mean µ and covariance matrix K.
Definition 2.1.10. Conditional Differential Entropy: For joint distribution of X and Y
with density function f (x,y), the conditional differential entropy is defined as [1]:
h(X |Y ) = 
Z
f (x,y) log f (x|y)dxdy. (2.23)
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The conditional differential entropy can be written in terms of differential entropy and
joint differential entropy as follows:
h(X |Y ) = h(X ,Y ) h(Y ). (2.24)
Finally, Kullback-Leibler distance (or relative entropy) and mutual information can
also be defined for continuous random variables.
Definition 2.1.11. Kullback-Leibler distance D( f ||g) between two densities f and g is
defined as [1]:
D( f ||g) =
Z
f log(
f
g
). (2.25)
Definition 2.1.12. Mutual Information The mutual information between two random
variables X and Y with density f (x,y) is defined as [1]:
I(X ;Y ) = 
Z
f (x,y) log(
f (x,y)
f (x) f (y)
)dxdy. (2.26)
According to this definition, it can be also written as follows:
I(X ;Y ) = h(X) h(X |Y ) (2.27)
= h(Y ) h(Y |X) (2.28)
= h(X)+h(Y ) h(X ,Y ). (2.29)
In addition, the Chain Rule, which is described for discrete case in Sec. 2.1.1, is also
valid for continuous case and combined with (2.19), (2.21) and (2.23) such that:
h(X ,Y,Z) = h(X ,Y |Z)+h(Z) (2.30)
= h(X |Y,Z)+h(Y,Z) (2.31)
= h(X |Y,Z)+h(Y |Z)+h(Z). (2.32)
2.1.4 Markov chains
In the system structure, which will be explained in Chapter 4, corresponding random
variables satisfy Markov chains conditions and in the rest of this thesis, this feature
leads important results. Formally, Markov chain is defined as follows [1]:
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Definition 2.1.13. Markov Chain: A discrete stochastic process X1,X2, . . .XN is said
to be Markov chain (Markov process) for n= 1,2, . . . ,N and x1,x2, . . . ,xN 2X if the
following condition satisfies:
Pr(XN+1 = xN+1|XN = xN ,XN 1 = xN 1, . . . ,X1 = x1) = Pr(XN+1 = xN+1|XN = xN).
(2.33)
In other words, the conditional probability of a random variable for a given all other
random variables in a stochastic process depends on only the conditional probability
of a random variable for given previous random variable. Markov chains results in
important features for joint entropy definition and chain rule.
Corollary 3. For a given Markov chain X Y  Z, the joint entropy can be written as:
H(X ,Y,Z) = H(X)+H(Y |X)+H(Z|X ,Y ) = H(X)+H(Y |X)+H(Z|Y ), (2.34)
where H(Z|X ,Y ) = H(Z|Y ).
Proof.
H(Z|X ,Y ) =  Â
x2X
Â
y2Y
Â
z2Z
p(x,y,z) log(p(z|x,y)) (2.35)
=  Â
x2X
Â
y2Y
Â
z2Z
p(x,y,z) log(p(z|y)) (2.36)
=  Â
y2Y
Â
z2Z
p(y,z) log(p(z|y)) (2.37)
= H(Z|Y ), (2.38)
where p(z|y,x) = p(z|y) because of the Markov feature.
2.1.5 Rate distortion theory
Unless lossless compression is used during coding, the finite representation of a
continuous random variable is not perfect. The distortion between a continuous
random variable X and its discrete representation Xˆ should be defined [1]. Rate
distortion theory is a very useful tool to understand the lossy compression schemes.
Here, the input of the rate distortion encoder is X and the output of the decoder is Xˆ .
In this representation, X is quantized into R bits and 2R distinct values can be used
to represent X . An optimal set of Xˆ , which is called the representation points are
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also defined, and its region, which minimizes the error measurement, is determined.
To measure distortion, the term d : X ⇥ Xˆ ! R+, where d represents a distortion
function, as a mapping from X⇥ Xˆ to positive real numbers. Distortion measure can be
selected according to the source variables, e.g squared error distortion given in (2.39)
for Gaussian sources:
d(X , Xˆ) = (X  Xˆ)2. (2.39)
And Hamming distortion is given for binary sources as:
d(X , Xˆ)⌘
⇢
0 X = Xˆ
1 X 6= Xˆ . (2.40)
The distortion between sequences X and Xˆ with length n is defined by:
d(X, Xˆ) = 1
n
n
Â
i=1
d(Xi, Xˆi). (2.41)
For a n-rate distortion code, there is an encoding function fn : X! {1,2, . . . ,2nR} and
a decoding function gn : {1,2, . . . ,2nR}! Xˆ. Then the distortion D can be described
as the average distortion over all codewords as:
D= E[d(X,gn( fn(X)))] =Â
x
p(x)d(X,gn( fn(X))) (2.42)
where E[·] is the expectation function. Achievability of a rate distortion pair (R,D) is
determined by the existence of a sequence of (2nR,n) and rate distortion codes ( fn,gn)
with limn!•E[d(X,gn( fn(X)))]  D. For the given source, the closure of the set of
achievable rate distortion pairs (R,D) is identified as a rate distortion region R. For
a given rate distortion region and a distortion D, the rate distortion function is the
infimum of the rates R. Based on this relation, the distortion rate function can be
described and the definition of rate distortion function R(D) is given in [1] as follows:
Definition 2.1.14. For given sourceX and decided distortion measure d(·, ·), the rate
distortion function R(D) is defined as:
R(D) = min
p(Xˆ |X):Â(X ,Xˆ)p(X ,Xˆ)d(X ,Xˆ)D
I(X ; Xˆ). (2.43)
In the rest of the thesis, the rate distortion theory will be placed at the basis of the
study. The following rate distortion functions for binary and Gaussian sources are the
16
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We choose the distribution of ˆX at the input of the channel so that the
output distribution of X is the specified distribution. Let r = Pr( ˆX = 1).
Then choose r so that
r(1−D)+ (1− r)D = p, (10.20)
or
r = p −D
1− 2D. (10.21)
If D ≤ p ≤ 12 , then Pr( ˆX = 1) ≥ 0 and Pr( ˆX = 0) ≥ 0. We then have
I (X; ˆX) = H(X)−H(X| ˆX) = H(p)−H(D), (10.22)
and the expected distortion is Pr(X ̸= ˆX) = D.
If D ≥ p, we can achieve R(D) = 0 by letting ˆX = 0 with probability
1. In this case, I (X; ˆX) = 0 and D = p. Similarly, if D ≥ 1− p, we can
achieve R(D) = 0 by setting ˆX = 1 with probability 1. Hence, the rate
distortion function for a binary source is
R(D) =
{
H(p)−H(D), 0 ≤ D ≤ min{p, 1− p},
0, D > min{p, 1− p}. (10.23)
This function is illustrated in Figure 10.4.  
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Each bit of description reduces the expected distortion by a factor of 4.
With a 1-bit description, the best expected square error is σ 2/4. We can
compare this with the result of simple 1-bit quantization of a N(0, σ 2)
random variable as described in Section 10.1. In this case, using the two
regions corresponding to the positive and negative real lines and repro-
duction points as the centroids of the respective regions, the expected dis-
tortion is (π−2)
π
σ 2 = 0.3633σ 2 (see Problem 10.1). As we prove later, the
rate distortion limit R(D) is achieved by considering long block lengths.
This example shows that we can achieve a lower distortion by consider-
ing several distortion problems in succession (long block lengths) than can
be achieved by considering each problem separately. This is somewhat
surprising because we are quantizing independent random variables.
10.3.3 Simultaneous Description of Independent Gaussian
Random Variables
Consider the case of representing m independent (but not identically dis-
tributed) normal random sources X1, . . . , Xm, where Xi are ∼ N(0, σ 2i ),
with squared-error distortion. Assume that we are given R bits with which
to represent this random vector. The question naturally arises as to how
we should allot these bits to the various components to minimize the
total distortion. Extending the definition of the information rate distortion
(b) R(D) forN (0,s2) distributed
source
Figure 2.1 : R(D) for binary and Gaussian sources.
first steps of the future extensions. In (2.44) and (2.45), the mathematical expr ssions
of R(D) for binary source and Gaussian source are given respectively as follows [1]:
R(D) =
⇢
H(p) H(D), 0 Dmin(p,1  p)
0, D>min(p,1  p) , (2.44)
where X 2 {0,1} and Pr(X = 1) = p, then the e tropy of X equals to H(p) (Bernoulli
distribution). The illustration of (2.44) g ven in Fig. 2.1a. R(D) is given for normally
distributed N (0,s2) source as follows and the graphical representation of (2.45) is
given in Fig. (2.1b):
R(D) =
⇢
(1/2) log(s2/D), 0 D s2,
0, D> s2 . (2.45)
2.2 Quantization and Lloyd’s Algorithm
In order to reduce distortion during encoding, quantization process become as an
important part of the system. In [1], two properties of a "good" quantizer are given
as follows:
• The distortion can be minimized with mapping of a source random variable X to
the representation Xˆ , which is closest to X . This mapping is defined in the set of
regions ofX and this set is called Voronei partition.
• The conditional expected distortion over their respective assignment regions should
be minimized by the reconstruction points.
As a starting point, an optimal set of reconstruction points should be defined in optimal
set of reconstruction regions by iteration. The expected distortion decrease at each
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stage of iteration. In 1957, Lloyd introduce a new algorithm based on this approach to
find optimal quantizer and he published his novel article in 1982 [34]. In that article,
Lloyd proposed an algorithm in order to reduce quantization noise in PCM (Pulse Code
Modulation) systems. Steps of the Lloyd’s Algorithm are given as follows:
1. Guess initial set of quanta levels xˆq, where q= 0,1,2, . . .M 1,
2. Calculate decision threshold by using following equation
tq =
1
2
(xˆq 1+ xˆq), q= 1,2, . . . ,M 1,
3. Calculate new quanta levels
xˆq =
R tq+1
tq x fX(x)dxR tq+1
tq fX(x)dx
, q= 1,2, . . . ,M 1,
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until there is no further distortion reduction
These evaluated quantization levels satisfy the optimum encoding in communication
system design, such as PCM systems. In this thesis, the quantized random values of
the individuals will be considered as the Pulse Amplitude Modulation (PAM) signals
without applying any digital coding scheme. In Chapter 6, the Lloyd Algorithm will
be used as an optimal quantizer in order to understad the effects of wireless channel
clearly without considering coding distortion.
2.3 Kurtosis Analysis
In statistics, kurtosis is a well-known technique to understand the closeness of a
given distribution to a desired shape, which can be in normal distribution, uniform
distribution or any other symmetric distributions. Kurtosis can be formally defined as
the standardized fourth population moment about the mean and it is given as follows
[2]:
b2 =
E[(X µ)4]
E[(X µ)2]2 =
µ4
s4
, (2.46)
where E[·] is the expectation operation, µ is the mean, µ4 is the fourth moment of the
mean, and s is the standard deviation.
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Table 2.1 : Kurtosis analysis for widely used distributions.
Distribution Kurtosis Values
Normal Distribution b2 3= 0
Uniform Distribution b2 3= 1.2
Laplace Distribution b2 3= 1.2
t Distribution with 5 d f b2 3= 6
β2 - 3 > 0 β2 - 3 < 0
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 D
en
sit
y
Figure 2.2 : Positive kurtosis (on the left side) and negative kurtosis (on the right
side) are compared with b3 = 0, which leads to normal distribution.
In Table 2.1, the corresponding kurtosis values are given for frequently used
distributions. In this thesis, the most important part in kurtosis analyses is evaluating
the normally distributed random variables. With respect to the kurtosis value, how
does the shape of the distribution change with the comparison of normal distribution
is shown in Fig. 2.2. In this figure, positive and negative kurtosis scenarios are given
with a reference normal distribution. It can be seen on the left side that heavier tails
and higher peak are observed than the normal for b > 3. On the contrary, lighter tails
and flatter peak are occurred for a distribution with negative kurtosis on the right side
for b < 3. Moreover, the shape of the distribution is resembling dirac delta for higher
b2, when it is getting closer to uniform distribution for lower b2.
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3. PRIVACY MODELS AND APPLICATION SCENARIO
Although privacy is a problem in both social sciences, there are various methods
to preserve privacy in information technologies, such as anonymizing, perturbation.
These different methods lead to different privacy definitions (e.g. differential privacy,
k-anonymity). In information technologies, privacy problem is firstly considered in
database or data mining applications, however private information leakage is also a
problem in communication systems. Before considering privacy definitions, the source
model will be given first. After that privacy models, which are used in this thesis,
will be introduced with the corresponding system model. Finally, possible application
scenarios, which are different smart city based scenarios, will be explained.
3.1 Source Model
In most of the existing sources models in privacy studies, information data is modeled
in table form.. This form is based on the database applications, but this type of data
is also available to study communication systems. In tables, a row corresponds to
an individual (entry) and a column in a data table corresponds to a attribute. These
attributes are denoted with X for an individual, and X denotes a vector of an attribute
for n individuals. For a given tableX , a random variable Xk 2X denotes kth attribute,
where k 2K = {1,2, . . . ,K} and K is the total number of different attributes for an
individual in [3]. Then the attributes can be written for n individual as a vector Xk. The
assumption is that these attributes of an entry are correlated each other as mentioned
in Sec. 3.4, while there is no correlation between individuals. The correlation between
attributes makes information leakage possible because an unreleased attribute can
be guessed with high accuracy if other released attribute has correlation with that
unreleased attribute.
In anonymization process, the classification of the data is vital with respect to privacy
concerns because each part of the data is not uniformly private. Therefore the attributes
in the data should be classified as [35]:
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Figure 3.1 : Illustration of quasi identifiers, which is joint data of different
information sources.
• an explicit identifier, which directly identifies individuals (e.g. name, ID number)
• a quasi-identifier, which can be used in combination with other information sources
to identify or potentially identify individuals (e.g. postal code, age, gender)
• sensitive information, which is the private information about individuals and must
be secret (e.g. diseases, salary)
• non-sensitive information, which can be revealed as desired
In anonymized data, explicit identifier should not be revealed and quasi-identifier
should be sanitized before release, while other attributes can be revealed as original
[36]. Formally, quasi-identifier (Q) is an important term to satisfy privacy since
they causes potential privacy leakages [18]. In addition, the quasi-identifier can
be interpreted as non-sensitive attribute, which can be linked with external data to
uniquely identify at least one individual [19]. In Fig. 3.1, an example quasi identifiers,
which are "Age" and "ZIP Code" of individuals. In this case, an attackers can easily
reach a curriculum vitae (CV) of an individual, which can be directly accessible on
online, then "Age" and "ZIP Code" information is leaked. Then this attacker combine
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Table 3.1 : An example for quasi identifiers, where quasi identifier X denotes the ZIP
codes of individuals.
Name X Y Name Xˆ Y
Paul 52062 m ** 52⇤⇤⇤ m
Eva 34685 m ** 34⇤⇤⇤ m
Antoine 52065 s ** 52⇤⇤⇤ s
Marion 34686 s ** 34⇤⇤⇤ s
this information with open source anonymized health records data. Even tough this
data is anonymized, it may still include ZIP code, age and health record without
anonymization, while it includes anonymized name information. Finally, this attacker
identify individuals with their health record information by considering very simple
attack.
In Table 3.1, an sanitization method G is used to anonymize the information in two data
sets given by the random variables X and Xˆ = G (X), where G (·) can be a deterministic
or random function. In this simple example, X shows the ZIP code of individuals and
Y indicates the marital status, where Y 2 {m(Married),s(Single)}. It is obvious that
I(Y ; X˜) I(Y ;X), since the utility is reduced. On the left side of the table, the original
data sets can be seen, while the anonymized data set is given on the right side. It can
be clearly seen that, the quasi idenfiers are partially anonymized whereas the name
information, which are explicit identifiers, are completely deleted.
Moreover, the statistical features of sensitive information and non-sensitive
information in the sanitized data still provide useful information. Nevertheless, any
adversary could not identify any individual by using the combination of sanitized
quasi-identifier and the background (or external side) information, in addition they
could not associate the sensitive information with the individuals. It is possible to
use multiple anonymization methods to minimize the disclosure of information, e.g.
random pertubation or even complete erasure of quasi-identifiers. On the contrary,
quality of the data and its utility are decreased at the same time [6].
As mentioned before, some attributes should be kept hidden (e.g. sensitive
information) and some other attributes (e.g. non-sensitive information) can be
revealed. These attributes are denoted as private (hidden) and public attributes,
respectively. Kr and Kh are sets of revealed and hidden attributes for the condition
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Kr [Kh =K in [3]. Then, the corresponding public and hidden random variables
can be written as Xr = {Xk}k2Kr and Xh = {Xk}k2Kh respectively. The number of the
private and public random variables may be variated with respect to the source and the
system designs. In extreme cases, some of the attributes may be classified as private
and public at the same in specific system designs for different outputs. For simplicity,
the number of the public and private attributes are minimized (e.g. K = 2) and the sets
of the public and private random variables do not intersect with each other.
3.2 Information Theoretic Privacy Measures
Information theory is a very powerful tool to measure information transition, and
naturally these tools are usable to understand information leakage with the privacy
concerns in information and communication technologies. Due to this reason, the
existing privacy definitions are mostly based on the information theory. In literature
many different privacy definitions are proposed (e.g Differential Privacy, t-closeness),
but k-anonymity has a straightforward definition and could be a first step to study
privacy topics. Allthough k-anonymity satisfies privacy concerns for increased k
values, but it is application dependent and the understanding of the data utility after
anonymization is weak. In order to analyze utility after anonymization, the utility
privacy trade-off is studied for databases in [26], when the encoding process is
considered as sanitization to increase privacy of the data. But actually the utility
privacy trade-off has longer history in literature, where this trade-off is studied for
the communication systems with respect to the rate distortion theory. In this chapter,
both k-anonymity anonymization scheme and the utility privacy trade-off definition
will be explained in information theoretical manner.
3.2.1 k-anonymity
In [18], k-anonymity privacy model is introduced by Sweeney, and this model can be
used for databases and table form data. This model is based on the quasi identifiers,
which should be sanitized before revealing the data. The formal definition of Sweeney
for k-anonymity is given as follows:
Definition 3.2.1. k-anonymity [18]: Let X be a table with and QX be the
quasi-identifier associated with it. X is said to satisfy k-anonymity if and only if
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Table 3.2 : 3-anonymity example. Original data and 3-anonymized data are presented
on the left side and on the right side respectively.
No ZIP Age Disease ZIP Age Disease
Code Code
1 52062 52 Diabetes 520** 5* Diabetes
2 52066 54 Ulcer 520** 5* Ulcer
3 52064 57 Diabetes 520** 5* Diabetes
4 63168 44 Flu 6316*  40 Flu
5 63167 42 Diabetes 6316*  40 Diabetes
6 63163 48 Cancer 6316*  40 Cancer
7 52066 30 Diabetes 520**  40 Diabetes
8 52064 35 Cancer 520**  40 Cancer
9 52061 20 Cancer 520**  40 Cancer
each sequence of values in QX appears in QXˆ , where Xˆ is the anonymized table, at
least k times.
In other words, each quasi identifier in the set of QX should be appear at least k times
in the released version of data Xˆ . As an example of k-anonymity, medical data of
the individuals are given with the address and age information in Table. 3.2. On the
left side, the original data is shown, while sanitized data, which are generated by using
k = 3 anonymity, are presented on the right side. In this table, ZIP code and age are
quasi identifiers and they should be appear at least 3 times in the sanitized table.
In [6], Bezzi explains the k-anonymity with an information theoretic measure. This
study is very important, because it leads to compare k-anonymity in terms of mutual
information.
Definition 3.2.2. [6] Let Xˆ be an anonymized database with a single group of
quasi-identifier with N records in the orginial tableX . The probability to re-identify a
record X of the original table given the anonymized record Xˆ is given by p(X |Xˆ). The
conditional entropy after k-anonymization is bounded by for each Xˆ 2 Xˆ such that:
H(X |Xˆ)  log(k) (3.1)
Corollary 4. [6] Let N be the number of tuples in the original dataset X and let
Xˆ be the anonymized dataset with k-anonymity, then the upper bound of the mutual
information is given as follows:
I(X ;Xˆ ) log
✓
N
k
◆
. (3.2)
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3.3 Trade off Between Utility and Privacy
The idea behind the utility privacy trade-off is based on the distortion concept. As
explained before, the perfect representation of the data is not possible most of the
time due to quantization and coding. Another reason of the distortion in wireless
communication systems are the inevitable disruptive effects of wireless transmission
channel. When all the concepts are considered, data are not transmitted perfectly and
this distortion leads to less utility. In utility privacy trade-off definition, privacy of the
private attribute are needed in addition to utility of the public attributes, which may be
correlated with the private attributes. And the distortion, which is resulted from coding
or channel effects, leads to high privacy, when it causes less utility at the same time.
As a result of this contrast, the utility privacy trade-off is appeared for various types of
information and communication technological concepts (e.g. communication systems,
databases, data mining systems).
The first appearence of the utility privacy trade-off is in [4], where the information
theoretic link between utility privacy trade-off and rate distortion theory is introduced
as rate distortion equivocation expressions for a source coding problem with the
privacy constraints. In [3], it is proved that the utility privacy trade-off region and the
distortion equivocation region is equal for the statistical source models (e.g. databases).
The utility privacy trade-off is mainly studied to investigate privacy in databases in
[3,26,27], where encoding schemes are considered as sanitization for the databases. In
these studies, the variations of the utility privacy trade-off are shown in different forms,
such that encoding both private and public data, existing side information or utility and
privacy necessity of an attribute. The interpretation of the rate for the databases is that
the rate is the precision of the data at per row. The connection between utility, privacy
and precision makes possible that the fix value of any constraint among these three
determine the value of other two constraints.
The utility privacy trade-off studies in databases have close relationship with the
studies about utility privacy trade-off in the communication systems. The main goal
of these studies is achieving maximum utility for desired privacy level with respect
to rate distortion theory based on the encoding schems, which are designed for
communication systems. In this section, the basics of the utility privacy trade-off for
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Figure 3.2 : The main system structure.
communication systems are introduced with the existing source model as a result of
the combination these existing literature.
3.3.1 System model
In order to understand the effect of the wireless communication environment on utility
privacy trade-off, the system, which is given in Fig. 3.2, is determined to study. The
main system structure involves the information source (e.g. an individual, or a data set
of individuals), which generates hidden (Xh) and public information (Xr); an encoder,
wireless channel and a decoder. There is a inevitable distortion between the input of
the encoder and the output of the decoder because of rate distortion theory. In this
chapter, the wireless channel effects are ignored and the utility privacy definitions are
given based on [3, 4, 26]. Then the effects of the wireless channel on utility privacy
trade-off will be explained in Chapter 5 and 6 for different source models.
As a coding and decoding scheme, the definitions of the encoding and decoding
functions of rate distortion equivocation scheme are given in (3.3) and (3.4). These
definitions are mostly based on the ordinary rate distortion scheme given in [1] due to
the relation between rate distortion theory and the utility privacy trade-off. Without
loss of generality, there are mainly two attributes (e.g. K = 2), where one hidden
attribute and one public attribute. For n individuals, these attributes are written as
vectors such that Xh and Xr. In general, the condition Kr ✓ Kenc ✓ K should
be satisfied, however in this thesis, only public information is encoded, such that
Kr =Kenc. In other words, only Xr is encoded in the chosen system model, while
Xh stays as original at the source. Therefore, the encoding function (FE), which is
used only for Xr, can be defined as [3, 4]:
FE(Xr) =W, W 2 {1,2, ...M}, (3.3)
whereW is the output of the encoding function andM = 2nR. Here R is number of bits
per individual. On the decoder side, W is decoded into received random variable Xˆr
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by using decoding function FD, which is defined as follows [3, 4]:
FD(W) = {Xˆ} (3.4)
where Xˆ = FD(FE(X)). The main system structure is shown in Fig. 3.2. Currently,
there is no channel error in the wireless channel and previous definitions are written
under these circumstances. With that structure, there is a Markov chain relationship
Xh Xr  Xˆr for the joint probability p(xh,xr, xˆr). It should be noted that the Markov
property is an important feature to further derivations.
3.3.2 Utility and privacy definitions
With the rate distortion approach, utility u can be quantified as the average distortion
between Xr and Xˆr [3]. The definition of utility variable for a desired distortion level
D is given as follows [4]:
u⌘ E[1
nÂ8n
d(XrXˆr)] D+ e, e > 0. (3.5)
In this relation, E[·] is the expectation function and d(·, ·) indicates a distortion
function. In this thesis, the Hamming distortion function, which is given in (2.40), is
chosen as distortion measure for binary sources and squared error distortion function
given in (2.39) is selected for normally distributed sources. Also, privacy p is measured
as given in (3.6), where E is the average number of uncertain bits per entry [4]:
p⌘ 1
n
H(Xh|W)  E  e, e > 0. (3.6)
In addition, privacy leakage l for desired leakage limit L is described in (3.7) [26]:
l⌘ 1
n
I(Xh;W) L  e, e > 0. (3.7)
The rate distortion equivocation functions are achievable for an existing coding
scheme (FD,FE) with the parameters (n,M), where the set of all tuples (R,D,E)
satisfy the constraints of u, p, l and M  2n(R+e). The graphical illustration of the
utility privacy trade-off is given in Fig. 3.3. On the left side of figure, the achievable
utility privacy equivocation regionR can be seen in Fig. 3.3. Moreover, the distortion
equivocation trade off region denoted asRD E is the projection ofRD E on the D and
E axis. This distortion equivocation regionRD E can be seen on the right side of Fig.
3.3. In [3], it is proved that utility privacy trade off region is equal to the distortion
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 (D) bounds the maximal achievable privacy and R(D,E)
is the minimal information rate (see Fig. 1(a)) for very large
databases (n! ). The proof follows along the lines of
Yamamoto’s proof in [10, Appendix 1] and is skipped in the
interest of space.
Theorem 2: For a database with side information available
only at the user, the functions  (D) and R (D,E) and the
regions RD E and R are given by
  (D) = sup
p(xr,xh)p(u|xr,xh) P(D)
H(Xh|UZ) (8)
R (D,E) = inf
p(xr,xh)p(u|xr,xh) P(D,E)
I(XhXr;U)  I(Z;U)
(9)
RD E = {(D,E) : D   0, 0  E    (D)} (10)
R = {(R,D,E) : D   0, 0  E    (D) , R   R (D,E)}
(11)
where P (D,E) is the set of all p(xr,xh, z)p(u|xr,xh) such
that E [d (Xr, g (U,Z))]  D and H(Xh|UZ)   E, while
P (D) is defined as
P (D) ⌘  H(Xh|XrZ) E H(Xh|Z)P (D,E) . (12)
While Theorem 2 applies to a variety of database mod-
els, it is extremely useful in quantifying the utility-privacy
tradeoff for the following special cases of interest.
i) The single database problem (i.e., no side information):
SDB is revealed. Here, we have Z = 0 and U = Xˆr, i.e.,
the reconstructed vectors seen by the user are the same as
the SDB vectors.
ii) Completely hidden private variables: Privacy is com-
pletely a function of the statistical relationship between
public, private, and side information data. The expression for
R(D,E) in (9) assumes the most general model of encoding
both the private and the public variables. When the private
variables can only be deduced from the revealed variables,
i.e., Xh   Xr   U is a Markov chain, the expression for
R(D,E) in (9) will simplify to the Wyner-Ziv source coding
formulation [26], thus clearly demonstrating that the privacy
of the hidden variables is a function of both the correlation
between the hidden and revealed variables and the distortion
constraint.
iii) Census and data mining problems without side infor-
mation: Information rate completely determines the degree
of privacy achievable. For Z = 0, setting Xr = Xh ⌘ X
(such that U = Xˆ), we obtain the census/data mining
problem discussed earlier. In general, due to an additional
equivocation constraint, R(D,E)   R(D); however, for this
case in which all the attributes in the database are public,
since  (D) = H(X) R(D,E)  H(X) R(D), and R(D)
is achievable using a rate-distortion code, the largest possible
equivocation is also achievable. Our analysis thus formalizes
the intuition in [8] for using the mutual information as an
estimate of the privacy lost. However in contrast to [8] in
which the underlying perturbation model is an additive noise
model, we assume a perturbation model most appropriate for
the input statistics, i.e., the stochastic relationship between
the output and input variables is chosen to minimize the rate
of information transfer.
IV. ILLUSTRATION OF RESULTS
We illustrate our results for two types of databases: one,
a categorical database and the other a numerical database.
Categorical data are typically discrete data sets comprising
of information such as gender, social security numbers and
zipcodes that provide (meaningful) utility only if they are
mapped within their own set. On the other hand, without
loss of generality numeric data can be assumed to belong
to the set of real numbers. In general, a database will have
a mixture of categorical and numerical attributes but for the
purpose of illustration, we assume that the database is of one
type or the other, i.e., every attribute is of the same kind. In
both cases, we assume a single utility (distortion) function.
We discuss each example in detail below.
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Figure 3.3 : R given on the left side andRD E given on the right side [3].
equivocation region RD E on D E plane. In the following definition, utility privacy
trade off functions will be explained based on these achievable regions.
Definition 3.3.1. For a wireless communication system, which includes c ding sc eme
FE and FD, the corresponding utility privacy trade-off functions, which are rate
distortion equivocation function R(D,E), distortion equivocation function G(D) and
leakage distortion function L(D), can be written in the achievable regions R and
RD E as follows [3, 4, 26]:
G(D)⌘ sup
I
H(Xh|Xˆr), (3.8)
R(D,E)⌘ inf
J
I(Xr; Xˆr), (3.9)
L(D)⌘ inf
I
I(Xh; Xˆr). (3.10)
These expressions are valid for I ⌘ p(xr,xh, xˆr) 2P(D) and J ⌘ p(xr,xh, xˆr) 2
P(D,E). The probability p(xr,xh, xˆr) is the family of probability distributions for
xh,xr 2X , xˆr 2 Xˆ and the constraints E[d(Xr,g(Xˆr))]D andH(Xh|Xˆr)  E, while
P(D) is defined as:
P(D)⌘ [H(Xh|Xr)EH(Xh)P(D,E). (3.11)
Based on the definition of the equivocation distortion function G(D) and the rate
dist rtion equivocation function R(D,E), optimal privacy and optimal utility can be
written mathematically in (3.12) and (3.13) respectively:
G(D) = H(Xh), (3.12)
R(D,E) = max(H(Xr),H(Xˆr)). (3.13)
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Proof. In order to reach optimal privacy, I(Xh; Xˆr) = 0 should be satisfied, and
consequently H(Xh, Xˆr) = H(Xh). On the other hand, optimal utility is observed for
H(Xr|Xˆr) = 0 or H(Xˆr|Xr) = 0, where Xr and Xˆr are completely dependent to each
other. As a result of that I(Xr; Xˆr) equals to max(Xr, Xˆr) to be maximized.
3.4 Smart City Scenario
With the deployment of state of art communication technologies with respect to IoT,
smart city based scenarios can be examined in order to reach better understanding of
the privacy problem. In these scenarios, there are lots of sensor devices, which record
all kind of information about individuals in daily life all the time such as traffic cameras
on streets, GPS trackers in cars, smart electronic households or body sensor devices.
The considered sensor devices may not be able to use cryptographic solutions because
of hardware limitations, such as low power consumption requirement [37]. Moreover,
the cryptographic solutions may not be useful in the considered system model given
in Fig. 3.2, since encryption of the hidden or public attributes do not increase the
privacy protection of the hidden attribute. If the hidden attribute is encrypted, the
encrypted hidden attribute leads to same of privacy leakage of original hidden attribute,
yet the hidden attribute is only accessible with the revealed attribute and correlation
information. On the other side, the encryption of the public attributes do not create any
difference on privacy, because the possible privacy risks remain same after decryption
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of public attribute at the receiver. The collected information may provide useful
information for receiver or service suppliers, but at the same time they may leak private
information, which should be kept secret. In this thesis, three possible application
scenarios in smart cities are decided. Before explaining the details of the scenarios, the
general information about the attackers should be given. In literature, the attacks are
classified as passive and active attacks. The passive attacks do not affect the behavior
of the network during the recovery of the information while the active attackers directly
impact the communication network structure by generating signals and can be detected
easily [15]. In addition, the most common and easiest attack form is eavesdropping
and passive monitoring, which result in easy access of the content when cryptographic
solutions are not available. This attack type is more effective when traffic analysis is
combined with the eavesdropping and passive monitoring [15]. Based on this fact, all
the attackers are eavesdroppers, which can passively monitor and analyze data traffic.
One of these scenarios is localization based, and the k-anonymity approach is studied
with smart traffic scenario in order to preserve location privacy of individuals. In
the second and third scenarios, the relationship between data utility and privacy are
investigated for different source types (e.g. binary attribute, normally distributed
attributes). Smart home scenario is considered as second case for binary attributes,
while smart hospital and body sensor network scenario is prepared for normally
distributed attributes in third scenario. They show that the privacy concerns and utility
requirements should be accounted in the system designs and this idea known as privacy
by design [38]. According to these two scenarios, a sensor reveals public attribute,
which is correlated hidden attribute, through the wireless channel and the transmitted
signal reach the destination. During the whole transmission time, the utility and privacy
analysis are done with respect to the the channel errors. Note that there can be a lot of
different variations of these scenarios for a sensor network system.
In the first scenario, a smart traffic case is considered and an example illustration of
this scenario is given for better understanding in Fig.3.4. Here, each car has at least one
Bluetooth device, thereby cars can be classified separately by using Bluetooth IDs. In
the smart cities, the Bluetooth receivers can be placed on street lights or signs in order
to find illegal traffic behavior such as high speed cases. These Bluetooth receivers are
connected to the base station through the use of wireless channels and they can detect
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Figure 3.5 : Application scenarios for utility privacy trade off for different source
models.
other devices around them easily. Now, there is no leakage of private information,
because these devices only know Bluetooth IDs of others. But actually, by using these
Bluetooth IDs, cars can be easily tracked in networks as well as individuals. This
tracking may lead to identify individuals, when very easy attacks to the privacy are
considered [33]. These attacks can be listed as:
1. Attack 1: If attacker detects the bluetooth tag of the car from starting point to
ending one (between sensor 1 and sensor n), the address of the home and the work
of the driver can be identified without the name of the driver.
2. Attack 2: In addition to Attack 1, the set of all workers name can be found, if the
workplace reveal their workers names on their webpage (e.g. website information
for a large institute).
3. Attack 3: In addition to Attack 2, the individuals can be identified with their
addresses, if the attacker can access a list of individuals with their addresses (This
is information is possible in telephone directories).
These attacks are used to identify people in smart city scenario, and as a solution
k-anonymity is used to stop private information leakage. In Chapter 4, this process
will be explained deeply.
In the second smart city scenario, smart homes, in which there are many different smart
electronic households, are considered. These electronic devices are mostly working in
"on" or "off" mode, and current working mode of the device sends to both people,
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who live in that house, and service supplier. The utility description of these different
destinations can be varied. In this scenario, which is given in Fig. 3.5a, people
want to know which devices are open and closed and control them remotely, hence
"on/off" modes of devices are enough to be modeled with binary attributes. On the
service supplier side, the statistics (e.g usage time, bills) are needed to know. When
considering privacy approach of the scenario, the short or long term behavior of the
people can be tracked by considering the information about which devices are open
at specific time. For example, it can be understood the existence of someone at home
based on the working mode of an air conditioner. The air conditioner will be possible
turned off, if there is nobody at home. On the other hand, it is highly possible that
working mode of it is "on", if someone is actually at home. So that leaving and arrival
time of people can be seen. It is obvious that both private information and information,
which has utility, are highly correlated, and this scenario is very suitable to study utility
privacy trade-off.
Finally, utility privacy trade-off for Gaussian sources are investigated for smart hospital
or body sensor network scenario, which is given in Fig. 3.5b. These state of art medical
technologies provide health status information of patients to doctors remotely even
being indoor, at outdoor or also in hospital. When the utility perspective is considered
in this scenario, medical information about the body of the patients (e.g. blood
pressure, body temperature) are monitored in real time and send to the doctors, nurses
or other responsible medical team. On the other hand, these revealed information is
highly correlated with quasi identifiers (e.g. age, height, weight etc) and sensitive
information (previous health records) of individuals. Consequently, an attacker can
reach public information using eavesdropping techniques and combine this type of
information with the sensitive information of individuals by using open source blood
pressure - age/height/weight tables.
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4. PRIVACY PRESERVINGWITH k-ANONYMITY
In this chapter, k anonymity is studied with an designed smart city scenario, which is
introduced in Chapter 4 for a data set. In original generated data, 16 individuals are
given with their Home ZIP, Work ZIP and Bluetooth ID. During the simulations, the
attacks explained in Chapter against privacy in first application scenario are mainly
considered and the attacker knows a public attribute in original or anonymized form.
For example, if attacker tries to attack ZIP information, the Bluetooth ID is known and
used to attack privacy. In this case, privacy protection is satisfied based on two different
anonymization decisions. One of the anonymization approach, both of ZIP information
of individuals are sanitized, while Bluetooth IDs are anonymized in second case. After
the anonymization process, privacy protection is measured with specific information
(2.16) and mutual information (2.13). This chapter is mostly based on the book chapter,
which is published during the studies [33].
4.1 Attack without Anonymization
In the generated data, 16 individuals are given in an exemplary Table 4.1 with their
Bluetooth IDs, home and work ZIP codes. The attacks againt privacy may be applied
to this data with the knowledge of the attacker. As an example, the attacker has the
knowledge that an individual with Bluetooth ID 33562214 moves from a place with
ZIP code 06659 to another place with ZIP code 06635. According to the Attack 3, this
attacker also can reach the list of people living a place with the ZIP code 06659 and
list of people working in a company, which has ZIP code 06635 via open information
sources (e.g. company websites, telephone lists). As a result, the person who has the
Bluetooth ID 33562214 is identified as I˙lkay Ocak, and the attack is succeeded.
4.2 Attack with Anonymization of the ZIP
In order to achieve privacy concerns by considering k-anonymity, the sanitized
attributes should occur at least k times in the anonymized table based on the definition
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Table 4.1 : Original Data SetX
Name Surname Home ZIP Work ZIP Bluetooth ID
Aybike Yalçınyüz 34387 34392 33562132
Annalena Schitzler 54432 54474 33562519
Burçak Ag˘rıdag˘ 34323 34382 19037321
Carolin Kanter 52436 52466 42075115
Dara Khajavi 52820 52466 19037022
Filip Rukavina 52841 52811 19037164
Gülfem Bas¸ak 34365 34373 42075015
I˙lkay Ocak 06659 06635 33562214
Julian Stermenmann 52441 52488 42075618
Kaan Avcı 06635 06627 42075894
Merve Çöplü 06656 06601 33562011
Martin Stürmer 52884 52442 42075761
Rebecca Hudina 52423 52442 19037828
Sare Erkovan 34394 34381 42075214
Shaghayegh Naimi 52839 52834 19037512
Sinan Tanju 34321 34308 19037001
of k-anonymity in 3.2.1. When 3-anonymity example is considered, last 2 digits of
ZIP codes are sanitized with respect to the data source and data distribution. Once
anonymization process is completed, the attacker tries to identify the individual, who
has the Bluetooth ID 33562214. As a result of this case, the attacker knows that both
home ZIP and work ZIP is 06600, but there are 3 different people, who has exactly
same home and work ZIP information. So that the attacker cannot decide who actually
has the attacking Bluetooth ID among {I˙lkay Ocak, Kaan Avcı, Merve Çöplü}, and the
Attack 3 is no longer successful after anonymization.
It is clear to see that the number of possible person is increased after anonymization and
it leads to higher privacy. On the other hand, there is inevitable information loss and
infomation theoretic definitions are used to measure it. Here H(X) = log(N), because
p(x) = 1N for the original table X , so that the entropy of the table is calculated as
H(X) = log(16) = 4. Moreover, for the anonymized table Xˆ , there are NXˆ records
of anonymized ZIP numbers, the probability of re-identifying a record Xˆ is p(X |Xˆ) =
1/NXˆ [6]. For 3 anonymity case, there are at least 3 entries, which have 34300 as a
ZIP code. Since, there is at least 3 persons, consequently, the probability p(X | xˆ) =
1/Nxˆ = 1/3. In the example of Table 4.2, for all xˆ, the number of records is Nxˆ = 3,
hence the entropy is
 H(X |Xˆ) = log
✓
1
k
◆
⇡ 1.585.
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As explained before, the specific information is bounded by (3.2) [6]. As a result of
that,
I2(X ; Xˆ) = H(X) H(X |Xˆ) log
✓
N
k
◆
.
Hence the result is I2(X , Xˆ) = H(X) H(X |Xˆ) = log(N/k) ⇡ 2.415. In Table 4.2,
the specific information results for different entries are equal to or less than 2.415, so
that they satisfy the upper bound condition. And the mutual information, which is the
expected value of specific information is calculated as 1.977 for the given table.
4.3 Attack with Anonymization of the Bluetooth ID
As a second option to satisfy privacy for chosen application scenario, the Bluetooth
IDs are anonymized, where the anonymized table is given in Table 4.2. If Attack 3
is taken into account again, the attacker knows the anonymized Bluetooth IDs given
in the table. As an example, Bluetooth ID 133562000 is known by the attacker, but
there are 4 different individuals and the attacker cannot decide who is the owner of this
ID from the set {Aybike Yalçınyüz, Annalena Schitzler, I˙lkay Ocak, Merve Çöplü}. As
a result, the attack again no longer successful again.
In this case, the different specific information values are observed, such that I2(X , Xˆ) =
log(N/k) = log(16/4) = 2 since the ID 133562000 can belong to 4 individuals.
The rest of the specific information results are calculated similarly in Table 4.2.
The average information transfer based on the mutual information metric is found
1.561, which is the average value of the specific information as before. When
the results obtained from 3-anonymity, which is based on ZIP anonymization, and
4-anonymity, which is based on Bluetooth ID anonymization, are compared, smaller
mutual information results are in 4-anonymity case observed. The reason of this
condition is that 4-anonymity leads better privacy protection because it cause more
distortion in data than 3-anonymity, consequently the utility of the data is reduced.
This observation about k-anonymity is a simple example of the utility privacy trade-off,
which is already explained in Chapter 4. Another issue about k-anonymity is that this
anonymization scheme is application specific and hard to combine with the physical
concepts of the communication systems (e.g. noise, fading, coding).
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5. UTILITY PRIVACY TRADE-OFF FOR BINARY SOURCES
The studies about k-anonymity show that the relation between data utility and privacy
is opposite and an application independent analysis is needed for communication
systems. In order to understand the balance between utility and privacy, the utility
privacy trade-off is very suitable in communication systems due to its relationship
with the rate distortion theory, which is already used in analysis for communication
systems. In this chapter, this trade-off is studied for binary sources and the effect
of the wireless channels on the trade-off is investigated. Even if the binary source
models are not realistic most of the time, they give the fundamental perspective of the
utility privacy trade-off analysis. The first study about utility privacy trade-off is based
on the behaviours of the binary source and channel models in [4]. When Yamamoto
introduced the utility privacy trade-off regions as a source coding problem with respect
to rate distortion theory in his novel study, the trade-off regions are presented with
examples based on binary sources (e.g. doubly symmetric binary sources (DSBS) or
Z-type sources) in [4]. Because of that, at first these regions based on DSBS will be
explained with theoretical perspective for error-free wireless channels in this chapter.
After that the impacts of the wireless channel will be considered theoretically with a
numerical example including DSBS and binary symmetric channel (BSC).
5.1 Utility Privacy Trade-off for Binary Sources for Joint Effects of Coding and
Channel
The main definitions of the utility privacy trade-off functions are already given as (3.8),
(3.9) and (3.10) in Chapter 4, and these functions will be presented for the binary
sources for the corresponding system model given in Fig.3.2. When the effects of
coding and channels are jointly considered, the overall distortion is the only source of
the less utility. In this case, the wireless channel block and coding blocks are combined
in the system model. For binary sources, the corresponding system model, where
overall distortion is taken into account, is shown in Fig. 5.1a. This system model is
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Figure 5.1 : Transition diagram for the system given in [4] with the cross
probabilities as original (a) and combined version of original (b).
based on the Yamamoto’s study [4], and the attributes are modeled with the doubly
binary symmetric source (DSBS) source. The characterization of DSBS, where Xr =
Xh = {0,1}, is given as follows:
q(x,y) =
1
2
(1  p)dxr,xh +
1
2
p(1 dxr,xh). (5.1)
In this relation, this source distribution can be seen in Fig. (5.1a) with respect to its
parameter p. Here, Xh is Bernoulli distributed with Pr(Xh = 1) = 0.5. Moreover, the
distortion measure is chosen as Hamming distortion function in the rest of this chapter
based on the expression (2.40). When the impacts of coding scheme and channel is
combined, the Markov chain relationship between the random variable can be written
as Xh-Xr-Xˆr with the joint distribution pxh,xr,xˆr(xh,xr, xˆr). Under these circumstances,
the equivocation distortion function G(D), the rate distortion equivocation function
R(D,E) and the leakage distortion function L(D) are given as:
G(D) = H(d+ p 2pd), (5.2)
R(D,E) = 1 H(d), (5.3)
L(D) = 1 H(d+ p 2pd), (5.4)
where p 2 {0, 12} and d 2 {0, 12}. In order to prove these equations, the easiest way
is using block diagram of the system. In followings, straightforward proofs of these
equations will be given respectively.
Proof. Derivation of (5.2): Based on the definition of G(D), which is given in (3.8),
H(Xh|Xˆr) should be calculated. In Fig.5.1a, the transition in the system from Xh
through Xˆr is shown with the cross probabilities. Furthermore, it is known that if
there is a binary symmetry between random variables A and B with cross probability
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p, the conditional entropy equals to H(A|B) = H(p) [1]. In this case, H(Xh|Xˆr) can
be calculated using cross probability approach and this probability can be find using
reduction techniques in diagram, which is shown in Fig.5.1b. As a result of that,
the conditional entropy and naturally G(D) is computed as H(Xh|Xˆr) = H(p+ d 
2pd)
Proof. Derivation of (5.3): When the equation I(Xr; Xˆr) = H(Xr) H(Xr|Xˆr) is
considered, both H(Xr|Xˆr) and H(Xr) should be calculated to find R(D,E). Similar to
the previous proof, the conditional entropy H(Xr|Xˆr) can be calculated as H(Xr|Xˆr) =
H(d). Also it is obvious that H(Xr) = 1 owing to Pr(Xr = 0) = Pr(Xr = 1) = 12 . Then,
R(D,E) = 1 H(d) is reached.
Proof. Derivation of (5.4) : The value of leakage distortion function equals to
I(Xh; Xˆr) and it can be calculated using the value of (5.2) because of the relation
I(Xh; Xˆr) = H(Xh) H(Xh|Xˆr). Clearly, H(Xr) = 1, then L(D) = 1 H(p+ d  
2pd).
5.2 Utility Privacy Trade-off for Binary Sources for Independent Effects of
Coding and Channel
In this section, the wireless channel impacts on the utility privacy functions for binary
attributes will be given in details. Firstly, these functions will be interpreted, where
the distortion based on coding and erroneous channel theoretically. This section of the
thesis is one of the most fundamental part, because it includes the new propositions
about the utility privacy trade-off definitions. After updating these definitions, an
example will be given for DSBS and BSC. Finally, the functions founded in examples
are compared with the corresponding simulations.
The system model given in Fig. 3.2 should be reproduced for the binary sources,
the code word variables, and the existence of the BSC. In Fig. 5.2, the updated system
model for binary sources is given. In this figure, firstly the relationship between hidden
and public attributes is modeled on the left side. In the middle, both of the distorting
effects of encoding and decoding is combined with the distortion parameter p. On
the right side of the figure, the BSC is shown with the error probability e. The main
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difference of this study from the previous works is that the impact of the coding and
wireless channel effects can be observed separetely. Then the transmission process C
over the wireless channel can be written with respect to the output of the encoderW as
follows:
C : Wˆ=
⇢
W, if error is not occurred
Wˆ, if error is occurred (5.5)
This transition process indicates that the input of the decoder Wˆ, can be distorted
version of W or same as W since imperfect channel conditions are probabilistic
and error free transmission is also possible. Due to this feature, the utility privacy
analysis should be investigated by considering (5.5) and the utility privacy trade-off
functions, which are given in [3,4,27]. These definitions do not cover the effects of the
wireless channel, consequently these functions are redefined with the joint distribution
p(xh,xr,w, wˆ, xˆh). Without loss of generality, the Markov relationship is still valid with
its new form, which can be written as Xh Xr W  Wˆ   Xˆr with p(xh,xr,w, wˆ, xˆh).
5.2.1 Utility and privacy definitions
As explained before in Chapter 4, utility u, privacy p and leakage l are based on the
desired distortion level D, average number of uncertain bits per entry E and privacy
leakage L given in (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7), and these expressions will be used to update
the utility privacy functions.
Proposition 1. The utility u, privacy p and leakage l, which have the constraints D,
E and L, are the functions of the source cross probability p, coding distortion d and
wireless channel error probability e for binary sources, such that p = f (p,d,e), u =
g(d,e) and l= h(p,d,e).
It means that, the wireless channel is another source of distortion in wireless
communication systems in addition to coding. Moreover, this distortion, which
includes coding distortion and channel errors, affects privacy level. Formally, the
rate distortion equivocation region R is the set of all tuples (R,D,E) satisfying the
constraints of (3.5), (3.6), (3.7) and M  2nR+e) for a given coding scheme (FD,FE)
with the parameters (n,M,e,p, l).
Proposition 2. In a wireless communication system under the effect of noisy channel
that includes coding schemes (FE) and (FD), the utility privacy trade-off functions,
42
X
h
X
r
W
0
1
0 0
1 1
1-p
1-p
1-d
1-d
p
p
d
d
X
h
X
r
^
0 0
1 1
1-(p+d+e-2(pd+pe+ed)+4pde)
X
r
^
0
1
1-e
1-e
e
e
Doubly Symmetric
Binary Source
Coding Distortion Binary Symmetric
Channel
X
h
X
r
^
0 0
1 1
1-(e+d-2ed)
1-(e+d-2ed)
e+d-2ed
e+d-2ed
1-(p+d+e-2(pd+pe+ed)+4pde)
(p+d+e-2(pd+pe+ed)+4pde)
(p+d+e-2(pd+pe+ed)+4pde)
Figure 5.2 : Updated transition diagram for the system given Fig. 3.2 designing with
DSBS and BSC.
which are equivocation distortion function (G(D)), the rate distortion equivocation
function (R(D,E)), and leakage distortion L(D) can be rewritten for the regions R and
RD E as:
G(D)⌘ sup
IB
H(Xh|Xˆr), (5.6)
R(D,E)⌘ inf
JB
I(Xr; Xˆr), (5.7)
L(D)⌘ inf
IB
I(Xh; Xˆr). (5.8)
These expressions are valid for IB ⌘ p(xh,xr,w, wˆ, xˆr 2 P(D) and JB ⌘
p(xh,xr,w, wˆ, xˆr) 2P(D,E) where p(xh,xr,w, wˆ, xˆr) is the family of the probability
distribution for xh,xr 2 X , xˆr 2 Xˆ , w, wˆ 2 W = {1,2, . . . ,M} and the constraints
E[d(Xr,g(Xˆr))] D and H(Xh|Xˆr)  E, whileP(D) is defined as
P(D)⌘ [H(Xh|Xr)EH(Xh)P(D,E) (5.9)
5.2.2 Binary symmetric channel example
To associate this utility privacy trade-off with a real world problem, this example
based on smart home scenario, which is mentioned in Chapter 4. In general K
value can be selected larger values, but in this example K = 2 for simplicity, where
one of the attribute is hidden (Xh), e.g. presence of individuals at home, and the
other attribute is public (Xr), e.g. on/off information of air conditioner. When this
scenario is considered, there is a relation between presence of people and mode of
the air conditioner. In general, people activate their air conditioner, if they are at
home or they will return to home in a short time. Consequently, the source model
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Figure 5.3 : Combined diagrams of the diagrams given in Fig. 5.2
between these two attributes, which are hidden (presence of people) and public (on/off
mode of air conditioner), should include a probabilistic relationship. So that the
source model is DSBS for the tuple (Xh,Xr) with the same probability distribution
q(xh,xr) given in (5.1) where xh,xr = {0,1} and p 2 [0, 12 ]. The wireless channel in
the Fig. 3.2 is selected as BSC, with the error probability e. In this condition, the
updated transition diagram is shown in Fig. 5.2 including wireless channel impacts.
According to Proposition 1, utility u, privacy p and leakage l are functions of source
cross probability p, coding distortion d and channel error probability e such that
p= f (p,d,e), u= g(d,e) and l= h(p,d,e). As a result of this proposition, the utility
privacy trade off functions G(D), R(D,E) and L(D) can be calculated as:
G(D) = G(p,d,e) = H(p+ e+d 2(pe+ ed+ pd)+4ped), (5.10)
R(D,E) = R(p,d,e) = 1 H(e+d 2ed), (5.11)
L(D) = L(p,d,e) = 1 H(p+ e+d 2(pe+ ed+ pd)+4ped). (5.12)
The derivations of these functions are very similar to the derivations for jointly effects
of coding and channel variation case, which are mentioned in Section 5.1. In this case,
G(D) are found using the cross over probability, which is given in Fig. 5.3a. On the
other hand, R(D,E) is derived using the cross over probability given in Fig. 5.3b. And
finally L(D) is written based on its direct relation with G(D). More details about these
derivations are given in Appendix A.1.
5.2.3 Numerical results
In this part of the thesis, the numerical results based on the MATLAB simulations will
be given with the utility privacy trade-off functions, which are defined in (5.10), (5.11)
and (5.12). These functions are considered as optimum results and they indicates lower
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Figure 5.4 : G(D) theoretical upper bounds and simulation results
or upper boundaries of the function for given variables. In the figures, which are given
as follows: simulation variables, p 2 {0,0.25,0.5}, d 2 {0,0.25,0.5}, and e 2 [0,0.5]
for theoretical interpretation of utility privacy trade off function and e 2 {0,0.25,0.5}
for the numerical examples. It should be noted that all the simulations are done for
n= 10000 entries. During calculations of theoretical bounds, the expressions given in
(5.10), (5.11) and (5.12) are used, while the definitions of the utility privacy trade-off
functions given in (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) are calculated in simulations.
Firstly, (5.10) will be interpreted with respect to Fig. 5.4. In this figure, (5.10) is plotted
with continuous lines (where e 2 [0,0.5]) for the determined sets of p, d and e. The
effects of p and d is known from the previous studies (e.g [4], [1]), and these results
show the same outcomes if an imaginary line is plotted for e = 0. In order to remind
joint effects of coding and channel case for (5.10), the equivocation is increased with
increased overall distortion d and cross probability between sources p. So that if one
of p or d is equal to 0.5, equivocation reaches its upper limit 1. These outcomes are
actually the same as optimal privacy given in (3.12), because H(Xh) = 1. Moreover, if
p= 0.25 and d = 0.25, the equivocation value is higher than 0.9, which is very close to
optimal privacy. When the results of numerical examples are considered, the observed
values are less than boundaries especially for the case d 6= 0 and p= 0, this difference
is caused by computational limits such as number of entries n. For that reason, it will
be observed that the difference between theoretical line and numerical results will be
decreased if n increase.
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Figure 5.5 : R(D,E) theoretical lower bounds and simulation results
As a main topic of this thesis, the impacts of the channel error e will be investigated for
(5.10) for binary cases. In theoretical analysis, it can be easily seen that increased value
of e results high privacy such that G(p,d,e = 0.5) = 1 and G(p,d,e = 0.25)   0.8.
These results show that only high error probability in BSC can cause high equivocation
in a system without considering p and d. When numerical results for e 2 {0,0.25,0.5}
are considered, all of these results are equal (d = 0 case) or under the optimal privacy
limit, which are actually the theoretical lines for e 2 [0,0.5]. Also as explained before,
better analysis can be achieved if n increased, as a result of that numerical results will
be getting closer to upper bounds.
Another perspective is to understand G(p,d,e) results is achieving optimal privacy,
which is G(p,d,e) = 1. According to Fig. 5.4, there are at least 3 different
combinations, which are p= 0.5 or d = 0.5 or e= 0.5, to achieve perfect equivocation.
Also, by using combination of these variables perfect or very high equivocation can be
achieved such that the combinations (p = 0.25,d = 0.25), (d = 0.25,e = 0.25) or
(d = 0.25,e= 0.25). In general, it can be assumed that very high equivocation can be
achieved at least two of these probabilities is greater than 0.25.
Second main results R(D,E) are based on rate distortion theory, which is explained in
Chapter 2. Similar to the G(D) analysis completed before, the results, which are related
this part, are given in Fig. 5.5. In this figure, both theoretical boundaries, which are
based on (5.11), and the numerical simulation results are given together in order to
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Figure 5.6 : L(D) theoretical lower bounds and simulation results
compare easily. In this case, the theoretical boundaries will be explained firstly. Based
on the definition of R(D,E), it is independent from p, so that the figure is plotted
in two dimensions with respect to e and d, and it should be remembered that higher
values of R(D,E) leads to more data utility in terms of Xr. In this figure, R values
indicates the number of bits for per entry. The lower bounds, which are plotted for
e 2 [0,0.5] and d 2 {0,0.25,0.5} are decreasing with the increased probability of d.
For the case d = 0, the figure is seen as same as the rate distortion function given in [1]
for binary case. It can be interpreted as coding distortion d and BSC channel error e
are equivalent, then these can be changed their places in the system diagram in Fig.
5.2. In case of increasing error in BSC, the rate value is decreasing critically, and the
lower bound of the system is reduced zero for e= 0.5. When considering both type of
the results, R can be zero at least one of d or e is equal to 0.5
When the numerical simulation results are considered for R(D,E), it is clear to see
that all of the results satisfy the lower bounds. If number of entries n is increased, the
difference between numerical simulation results and lower bound will be decreased. In
theory, rate value can be increased in different way such as source or channel coding
to satisfy successful communication, but all of these methods creates more privacy
leakage. When Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5 are compared at the same time, for perfect or
very high privacy (e.g. (d = 0.5,e), (d,e= 0.5), (d = 0.25,e= 0.25)) cases proves this
comment.
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Finally, the latest utility privacy function L(D) theoretical boundaries, which are based
on (5.12) and numerical simulation results are given in Fig. 5.6. Because of the direct
relationship between (5.10) and (5.12), the results can be interpreted similarly. The
leakage function basically shows the mutual information between hidden source Xh
and the system output Xˆr. If mutual information value is high, it means that high data
leakage will be observed. As a result of that, these random variables are statistically
independent if L(D) = 0, and that is the best case scenario for equivocation approach.
When considering G(D), it is called optimal privacy, so that G(D) = 1 and L(D) = 0
lead same results. Consequently, the symmetry between Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.6 can be
seen very easily. In order to explain leakage in terms of channel error, leakage value
is increased with lower channel error probability similar to the low cross probability
between sources and distortion probability.
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6. UTILITY PRIVACY TRADE-OFF FOR GAUSSIAN SOURCES
In Chapter 5, the utility privacy trade-off functions are derived for DSBS and BSC. But
these type of source and channel models are not realistic all the time. On the contrary
to discretely distributed or binary valued attrbiutes, continuously distributed attributes
and continuously distributed channel models, are better to deal with real life problem
with respect to the utility privacy trade-off. The utility privacy trade-off is already
studied for normally distributed attributes in databases in [3, 26], where the encoding
scheme is considered as sanitization. Therefore, only coding distortion is investigated
in terms of the utility privacy trade-off functions and there is no wireless channel effects
inspectation. In this chapter, the existing utility privacy trade-off functions are derived
for normally distrbiuted attributes, where the normally distributed channel noise is a
part of wireless communication system. The normally distributed random variables
are chosen since normal distribution is widely studied in information theory (e.g Rate
distortion theory).
In this chapter firstly, the definitions of (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) will be given for normally
distributed Xr and Xh with respect to [26]. We assume that the wireless channel
given in Fig. 3.2 creates additional Gaussian noise, which leads more distortion and
naturally affects utility privacy trade-off. As a consequence, the utility privacy trade-off
definitions should be updated for this system model in the rest of the chapter. At the
end of the chapter, the effects of the normally distributed wireless channel on the utility
privacy trade-off functions are investigated with a numerical example and statistical
results are presented.
6.1 Utility Privacy Trade-off for Normally Distributed Attributes for Databases
Beyond the binary case, which is presented in [4], Sankar et. al derived the
corresponding expressions for normally distributed attributes with respect to the
definitions (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) in [3,26]. These studies aim to understand the utility
privacy trade-off behaviour in databases, and there is no communication perspective in
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Figure 6.1 : System diagrams fo normally distributed sources
these studies. In this case, the only distortion source is the encoding (sanitization).
Consequently, the database includes only the hidden and public attributes Xr, Xh
and the received public attribute Xˆr, which is distorted due to encoding. The system
model, which is expressed in [3, 26], is shown in Fig. 6.1a with respect to encoding
distortion, when the utility privacy trade-off analysis for databases in [3, 26] and the
rate distortion theory for Gaussian sources in [1] are jointly considered. The public
attribute Xr and private attribute Xh are jointly distributed normal with both zero mean
and variances s2Xr and s
2
Xh . The correlation coefficient between Xh and Xr is given as
rXhXr = E[XrXh]/sXrsXh . In this system model, Xˆr =Xr+D, whereD is independent
normally distributed distortion with zero mean. This additional distortion term can
be thought as sanitization distortion. Here, D is normally distributed with variance
s2D = E[var(Xr|Xˆr)] 2 [0,s2Xr ].
One important fact is that utility privacy expressions, which are explained in Chapter 4,
are defined with respect to entropy definition (2.1), which is based on discrete random
variables. In this chapter, the random variables are continuously dsitrbiuted, as a result
the differential entropy term given in (2.19) should be used in stead of standard entropy
definition. While some of these functions do not create any difference in notation, some
of others (e.g. (3.6), (3.8)) should be redefined based on differential entropy expression
(2.19). In addition, as a distortion measure, the squared error distortion given in (2.39)
will be used in the rest of the chapter.
As explained in Sec. 3.3.1, when only Xr is encoded, the system can be modeled
as a Markov chain with the form Xh Xr  Xˆr. This Markov property is significant to
derive the utility privacy trade-off functions and further trade-off functions for different
system models, which may include erroneous wireless channel. In [26], the rate
distortion function equals to I(Xh,Xr; Xˆr) and this term is also equal to I(Xr; Xˆr) due
to the Markov chain property (2.33). As a result, the following definition satisfies the
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utility privacy trade-off features for normally distributed attributes when only public
attribute (Xr) is encoded.
G(D) = 1
2
log(s2Xh [(1 r2XhXr)+r2D/sX2r )). (6.1)
R(D,E) =
1
2
log(
s2Xr
D
). (6.2)
L(D) =
1
2
log(
1
[(1 r2XhXr)+r2XhXrD/sX2r ]
). (6.3)
The derivations of these functions are guided to extend the functions for erroneous
channel case and the step by step derivations are given in Appendix A.2. In literature,
these functions are derived for the database privacy, but same approaches, which are the
rate distortion analysis and Markov property, can be used in communication systems
in order to investigate the channel effects on the utility privacy trade-off. The next
chapter focus on the investigation of the utility privacy trade-off based on the channel
effects.
6.2 Utility Privacy trade-off for Gaussian Sources for Erroneous Channels
In this section, the utility privacy trade-off functions for normally distributed attributes,
which are given in Sec. 6.1, will be updated for the existence of noisy wireless channel.
Similar to the Sec. 5.2, the transmission process is described in (5.5). According to
the updated system model shown in Fig. 6.1b, the additive channel noise variable and
naturally the code words are added to the first version of the system model given in
Fig. 6.1a. As explained in Sec. 6.1, Xh, Xr and Xˆr are distributed normally with
zero means and identical variances. Moreover, the code word variables are normally
distributed such as W ⇠ N (0,s2W) and Wˆ ⇠ N (0,s2Wˆ). In this case, a conflict
between theoretical and practical applications can be occurred, because W and Wˆ
are discrete random variables in practice. But continuous random variables are needed
in order to investigate the wireless communication system as one compact form and
calculate the utility privacy trade-off functions. Because of that reason, these random
variables are assumed as normally distributed and in practice, it is shown that they
converge to normally distributed random variables with increased code length M. In
addition, the wireless channel noise denoted as N is distributed Gaussian with zero
mean and s2N variance. Finally, the coding distortion, which originally comes from
rate distortion theory, denoted as D and it has also normally distribution with zero
51
mean and identical variance s2D similar to given in [1]. Under these assumptions and
with given corresponding random variables, theMarkov chain is still valid. In this case,
it can be formed as Xh Xr W  Wˆ   Xˆr with the joint distribution p(xh,xr,w, wˆ, xˆr).
6.2.1 Utility and privacy definitions
As explained before, the random variables are continuous random variables with
normal distribution, therefore the utility privacy trade-off functions should be redefined
in terms of differential entropy. There is no difference in notation in (3.5) and (3.7)
definitions between discrete and continuous cases. The only difference is the distortion
function d(., .) is chosen squared error distortion function (2.39). On the other hand
(3.6) should be written in terms of differential entropy terms as follows:
p⌘ 1
j
h(Xh|Xˆr)  E  e, e > 0. (6.4)
Proposition 3. The utility u, privacy p and leakage l, which have the constraints D,
E and L, are the functions of the correlation between Xh and Xr rXhXr , the standard
variance of coding distortion sD and the standard variance of noise sN such that
p= f (rXhXr ,sD,sN), u= g(sD,sN) and l= h(rXhXr ,sD,sN).
In other words, wireless channel effects are another source of distortion in addition to
coding, thereby the privacy and utility results are affected from the noisy channel. As
a formal explanation, the rate distortion equivocation region R is the set of all tuples
(R,D,E) satisfying the constraints of (3.5), (3.6), (3.7) and M  2nR+e) for a given
coding scheme (FD,FE) with the parameters (n,M,u,p, l).
Proposition 4. In a wireless communication system under the effect of noisy channel
that includes coding schemes (FE) and (FD), the utility privacy trade-off functions,
which are equivocation distortion function (G(D)), the rate distortion equivocation
function (R(D,E)), and leakage distortion L(D) can be rewritten for the regions R and
RD E as:
G(D)⌘ sup
IG
h(Xh|Xˆr), (6.5)
R(D,E)⌘ inf
JG
I(Xr; Xˆr), (6.6)
L(D)⌘ inf
IG
I(Xh; Xˆr), (6.7)
where IG ⌘ (xh,xr,w, wˆ, xˆh) 2 P(D) and JG ⌘ (xh,xr,w, wˆ, xˆh) 2 P(D,E) for
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p(xh,xr,w, wˆ, xˆh), which is the family of the probability distribution such that for
xh,xr 2X , xˆr 2 Xˆ , w, wˆ2W = {1,2, · · · ,M} and the constraints E[d(Xr,g(Xˆr))]D
and h(Xh|Xˆr)  E, whileP(D) is defined as:
P(D)⌘ [h(Xh|Xr)Eh(Xh)P(D,E). (6.8)
In addition to the utility privacy trade-off analysis for databases, the effect of
the wireless channel systems can be seen with a probabilistic approach, where
p(xh,xr,w, wˆ, xˆh) indicates that W and Wˆ could be different. These differences are
resulted due to the variations in the wireless transmission environment and rely on
mostly noise and fading.
6.2.2 Wireless channel with Gaussian noise example
In this part of the thesis, a numerical example is done to combine the utility privacy
trade-off with sensor network scenario. Similar to the binary example done in Chapter
5, K = 2 is chosen for simplicity. As an application model, the smart medical systems
described in Chapter 4 is determined, where Xr indicates public medical information
(e.g. blood pressure) and Xh shows the hidden information such as a quasi identifier
(e.g. age of patient). Without loss of generality, all the random variables are assumed as
normally distributed with zero mean and identical variances. Moreover, the correlation
between distorted code word Wˆ and system output is rWˆXˆr and it is very close to 1 with
increasing number of quantization level. That is why rWˆXˆr is not the a variable of the
utility privacy trade-off functions. In this type of system, the utility privacy functions
are given as follows:
G(D) = G(rXhXr ,sD,sN) =
1
2
log(2pes2Xh(1 r2XhXr
s2Xr
s2Wˆ
)), (6.9)
R(D,E) = R(sD,sN) =
1
2
log(
1
1  (s
2
Xr
s2Wˆ
)
), (6.10)
L(D) = L(rXhXr ,sD,sN) =
1
2
log(
1
1  (r2XhXr
s2Xr
s2Wˆ
)
), (6.11)
where s2Wˆ = s
2
N + s2D + s2Xr . These functions can be considered as the theoretical
boundaries for given system structure in Fig. 6.1b. The important issue about
these expressions is that (6.9), (6.10) and (6.11) are the theoretical bounds (upper
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or lower) for the continuous sources can be reached exactly Gaussian distributed
random variables, which is not easily provided in real system. The derivations of
these expressions are given in Appendix A.2 in details not to break the section with
long equations. In the next section, these functions are studied with the simulations for
different system parameters.
6.2.3 Numerical results
The numerical example is firstly based on calculating theoretical bounds considering
(6.9), (6.10) and (6.11), then the simulations are done by calculating (3.8), (3.9) and
(3.10) for the system structure. The simulations are completed by using MATLAB
for n = 10000 entries for different system parameters (e.g. M, rXhXr , sN ). As a
quantization scheme, Lloyd Algorithm, which is explained in Chapter 2, is chosen
since it provides the optimum quantization levels. These quantization scheme is used
to find optimum M-ary PAM bounds. Then the quantized signals are modulated with
the M-ary PAM and send over wireless channel. According to [1], zero encoding
distortion is possible if the R value, which indicates the number bits for entry, equal or
larger than four. As a result of that, the number of bits per entry is decided as {2,3,4}
in order to study different distortion levels. In this case, these values lead to various
distortion variances {s21 ,s22 ,s23}, and the set of distortion variances are decided as
s2D 2 {0.3,0.2,0.1} after studying in with computer simulations. Furthermore, the
source correlation coefficient value denoted as rXhXr with the sets of its possible values
{0.25,0.5,0.75}. 0 and 1 are not considered as the correlation coefficient values,
because these are the extreme values for the system. On one hand, if rXhXr = 0, there
is no need to keep information private because there is no relation between hidden
attribute Xh and public attribute Xr. On the other hand, if rXhXr = 1, hidden and public
attributes show same statistical behavior. As a result, there is no private information.
Another system parameter Gaussian noise variance set is given for theoretical analysis
s2N 2 [0,1] and for numerical examples s2N 2 {0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1}. At last, the source
variances s2Xh = 1 and s
2
Xr = 1, which can be considered their signal powers, are equal
to 1. For that structure, the lowest value of SNR (signal-to-noise ratio) is 0 dB when
s2N = 1.
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Figure 6.2 : G(D) theoretical upper bounds and simulation results
At first, the privacy analysis will be done based on the theoretical upper bound given
in (6.9). If the theoretical case, where s2N 2 [0,0.5], are considered, there is no exact
numerical upper bound for perfect privacy. Because the upper bound is based on the
source variances directly. For given system parameters (e.g. s2Xh = s
2
Xr = 1), the
upper bounds is G(rXhXr ,sD,sN) = 2.0471. This calculation can be done using (6.9),
where s2Xh = 1 and rXhXr = 0, which is the extreme case. For given other source
variances, the upper bound of privacy will be changed considerably. For example,
G(rXhXr = 0,sD,sN) = 2.54 for given s2Xh = 2 and G(rXhXr = 0,sD,sN) = 2.84 for
given s2Xh = 3.
According to the Fig. 6.2, it can be seen that there are different options to reach
perfect privacy, which equals to 2.0471 with the given parameters. One of options is
rXhXr = 0.25 and in that case, the noise variance and number of quantization level are
not considerably important, because all the cases lead to almost perfect privacy. For
rXhXr = 0.5, which can be considered as reasonable correlation, equivocation values
are still very close to upper bound and very good equivocation can be succeed even
if there is very little noise in wireless channel. The last case, where the correlation
between Xh and Xr is high with the coefficient rXhXr = 0.75, the noise variance and
number of quantization level are getting important. It can be clearly seen that, privacy
upper bound is decreasing with the low noise and increased number of quantization
level.
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Table 6.1 : Kurtosis Analysis
Random Variable M Step Size Kurtosis
W 4 88954211 ⇠ 2.22
W 8 88954415 ⇠ 2.72
W 16 79855452 ⇠ 2.92
Wˆ 4 54125985 ⇠ 2.22 2.83
Wˆ 8 79855214 ⇠ 2.72 2.95
Wˆ 16 79855652 ⇠ 2.92 2.98
Xˆr 4 54125985 ⇠ 1.73 2.21
Xˆr 8 79855214 ⇠ 2.13 2.72
Xˆr 16 79855652 ⇠ 2.45 2.93
When the numerical examples results are considered, the first important thing is that
all the results are under the upper bound of equivocation and satisfy the condition. For
rXhXr = 0.25 and rXhXr = 0.5 cases, the results are very close to the upper bounds,
while there are some differences between the results and the boundaries for the case
rXhXr = 0.75. These difference are caused by various reasons. Firstly, the differential
entropy and related functions (e.g mutual information, joint entropy) are defined for
continuous random variables, and the calculation of these functions can be done with
inevitable errors because in simulations should be discrete even if there are generated
in continuous form. To reduce these errors, the calculation step, which is an important
parameter of the calculation from continuous case to discrete case, should be chosen
carefully since it decides normality of the system. Secondly, the random variables such
as W, Wˆ and D are not perfectly normal distributed for less number of quantization
level.
The kurtosis analysis for the random variables, which is explained in Chapter 2, is
given in Table 6.1 based on various number of quantization level. According to this
table, the founded kurtosis results are presented for the random variablesW, Wˆ and Xˆr
with respect to theM. Also it should be remembered that a random variable is normally
distributed if its kurtosis value b2 is equal to 3 based on Table 2.1. When the results
forW is considered, the its kurtosis level, and naturally its normality only depends on
the M. It is clear to see that W is getting close to normal distributed for increased M.
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Figure 6.3 : R(D,E) theoretical lower bounds and simulation results
On the other hand, the normality of Wˆ and Xˆr depend on both M and and the noise
variance s2N. The effects of the noise create variations on the kurtosis level for one M
value. The results show that in many cases in simulations, the random variables are
not perfectly normal distributed, so that these condition leads to differences between
theoretical boundaries and numerical results.
In Fig. 6.3, the rate-noise power graph is shown with the theoretic lower bounds and
numerical simulation results. If the lower bound is analyzed first, the lines in three
different colors based on the number of quantization levels indicates the minimum
number of R for known noise power for lossless communication. In that case, only
lossy communication between transmitter and receiver can be succeed [1] under the
lower bounds. As explained in Chapter 2, high values of R means more utility at the
receiver. Moreover, it has been discussed before that wireless channel noise create
extra distortion in addition to coding theory, then this graph is presented based on the
noise variance of the channel. Here, possible low rate bounds values are decreasing
with the increased noise and lower number of quantization levels. It is obvious that,
both of these actions creates more distortion in overall system, and also these actions
create more privacy as discussed in previous paragraphs. In theoretical perspective,
this plot still satisfy the basic rate distortion approach, which is discussed in Chapter 2
and the utility privacy trade-off with the existence of channel noise.
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Figure 6.4 : L(D) theoretical lower bounds and simulation results
In practice, the numerical results are given based on different noise power levels and
number quantization level in Fig. 6.3. These results basically satisfy the lower bound
condition (6.10), and behave in similar manner like theoretical lines. In other words,
the numerical results of R are increasing with decreasing noise variance and higher
number quantization level. The difference between theoretical and numerical approach
can be caused by the normality difference, which is indicated in Table 6.1. Also,
the values can be increased via different techniques such as error correction codes or
different coding schemes to satisfy better communication, however these techniques
violates privacy when wireless noise can be considered as a parameter to increase
privacy. Here, the utility privacy trade-off is reappeared by considering explained
cases.
At last, the leakage analysis is done with respect to the lower bounds and numerical
results, which are given in Fig. 6.4. As explained in Chapter 5 for binary cases, the
leakage results are based on the symmetry between the leakage (6.11) and privacy
(6.9). In Fig. 6.4, perfect privacy is plotted for L(rXhXr ,sD,sN) = 0 because there is
no information transfer between Xh and Xˆr, if I(Xh; Xˆr) = 0 based on the definition of
mutual information. Now, it can be interpreted as the the upper bound of the leakage
is I(Xh; Xˆr) = h(Xh) = 2.0471 for s2Xh = 1, where h(Xh|Xˆr) = 0, which is the lower
bound of the equivocation function (6.9). As a result of this symmetry, the privacy or
leakage can be found from each other and it leads an important advantage in terms of
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Table 6.2 : Utility privacy data statistics for different parameters (rXhXr = 0.75)
Number of Distortion Noise Privacy Utility
Entries (n) Variance sD Power s2N Statistics Statistics
10000 0.3 0 74% 53%
10000 0.3 0.5 82% 29%
10000 0.3 1 89% 14%
10000 0.2 0 70% 74%
10000 0.2 0.5 78% 37%
10000 0.2 1 87% 19%
10000 0.1 0 68% 82%
10000 0.1 0.5 76% 40%
10000 0.1 1 84% 20%
1000000 0.3 0 76% 58%
1000000 0.3 0.5 84% 31%
1000000 0.3 1 91% 15%
1000000 0.2 0 72% 66%
1000000 0.2 0.5 80% 36%
1000000 0.2 1 90% 18%
1000000 0.1 0 71% 85%
1000000 0.1 0.5 80% 40%
1000000 0.1 1 89% 20%
computational convenience. Depends on the different system structures, one of terms,
which has easier computation, can be calculated faster than other.
In Fig. 6.4, the effects of correlation coefficient can be clearly seen in both theoretic
and numeric manner. Here, the effects of noise power and M can be discarded when
rXhXr is low. But more importantly, noise power and M play critical role if rXhXr  
0.75. Similar to the previous Figures 6.2 and 6.3, the computational difference between
theoretical and numerical results are based on imperfect normally distributed random
variables.
6.2.4 Statistical results
Since the statistical privacy of people are interested instead of privacy of individuals,
the results should be given also in statistics. These results are calculated based on
the ideas of "perfect privacy" and "perfect utility" for G(rXhXr ,sD,sN) and R(sD,sN)
respectively. Numerically, G(rXhXr ,sD,sN) = h(Xh) = 2.0471 leads perfect privacy
based on the idea given in Chapter 4 and naturally it can be written as 100% private.
Similarly, R(sD,sN) = max(h(Xr),h(Xˆr)) = 2.0471 results in perfect utility with
100% data usability. As a result, privacy and utility statistics can be calculated as
follows:
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Privacy Statistics=
G(rXhXr ,sD,sN)
h(Xh) = 2.0471
, (6.12)
Utility Statistics=
R(sD,sN)
h(Xr) = 2.0471
. (6.13)
With the consideration of these equations, the results given in Fig. 6.2 will be
explained with statistics perspective. As explained before, the results are very close
to perfect privacy level 2.0471 for rXhXr = 0.25 and rXhXr = 0.5. Consequently the
privacy protection is provided at least 95% for these setups when n   10000. This
means that it is not possible to find hidden attribute (e.g. ages) of individuals in a
group of 10000 people by considering public attribute (e.g. blood pressure) with very
high probability. When the data utility perspective is considered, in general the utility
statistics are less than 10%, which cause very little information about public attribute
to the user at the end of the system. More importantly, the rXhXr = 0.75 case should
be analyzed carefully because the utility privacy trade-off can be seen easily and more
comments can be made based on desired utility or privacy. In Table. 6.2, two different
entry numbers are considered and the statistical results are given for rXhXr = 0.75 with
respect to sN and sD. In this table, even in the worst case scenario for privacy levels
(e.g. such as 68  70%), the majority of the entries are in safe with high data utility.
But depends on the application and data, this level of privacy cannot be enough for the
user. In general, the privacy increase around 10% results in utility decrease in the level
of 20  40% and the exact utility loss can be determined based on other parameters,
which are sD and sN. Other important fact is the number of data entries. It can be seen
that the privacy statistics are increasing with high number of n. In other words, hiding
is easier in very large groups such as the people living in a big city with the population
n = 1000000. On the other hand, if n is getting lower, both privacy and utility of the
data set are decreasing simultaneously in many cases. It can be happened because the
probabilistic approach in simulations does not match with the theoretic expression and
the results fluctuate in large intervals.
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In near future, the amount of the information collection and transmission will be
increased drastically since new sensor networks will make everything "smart", and
they will be highly connected to each other. In addition to the increased information
collection, machine learning algorithms will run to process this information and
update its intelligence to make its decision more accurate. It means that the collected
information may include private information about individuals (e.g. location or blood
pressure of individuals). This private information can be processed and transmitted in
very short time to the destination. This huge accessibility of information leads to easier
daily life, but there are important negative effects such as privacy leakage. Thereby,
the private information about individuals will be processed and transmitted and privacy
should be not negotiable in best case scenario. When considering the privacy in
information technologies with new deployments, the description of the privacy is hard
to explain because privacy is mostly considered as a social ethic concept. However,
many different approaches are already developed to prevent privacy in information
technologies. In this thesis, privacy preserving methods and utility privacy trade off
model are investigated with the consideration of smart city scenarios based on IoT
term.
Among of the these employed scenarios, firstly, k anonymity privacy countermeasure
is studied with smart city traffic scenario. This part of the thesis is based on preserving
location privacy of the individuals and not being identified from any attackers.
According to this scenario, each car in the traffic carry an Bluetooth tag, and the
Bluetooth receiver, which can be placed on traffic signs, can track the cars easily.
Based on this structure, an attacker can easily access the address of individual by using
open source information. In order to prevent this leakage, k anonymity is employed.
The results show that privacy protections is achievable by using k-anonymity with
high accuracy, however this type of anonymization is application specific and leads
to less data utility. Also it is hard to combine k-anonymity definition with the
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physical layer facts of communication systems. Therefore, the utility privacy trade-off,
which is application independent and gives theoretical bounds of privacy and utility is
studied in communication systems. The sections about the k-anonymity investigation
is published in [33] during the thesis studies.
In the second and third scenarios, utility privacy trade-off is analyzed to privacy
leakage and data utility in wireless communication channels with respect to the impacts
of wireless channel. This trade-off is based on the accessibility of hidden attributes
of individuals by using its correlated public attributes. Here, if the public attribute
is distorted completely, hidden attribute is safe, but there is no utility. On the other
side, if the correlated public attribute reveals perfectly, it is easy to reach hidden
attribute. It leads to perfect utility and no privacy. As a second scenario, the utility
privacy trade-off is studied for binary attributes with noisy wireless channel. Here,
the proposition about the utility privacy trade-off functions for binary attributes is
that the utility privacy trade-off constraints u, p and l, are considered as a functions
of system parameters source cross probability p, distortion d and error probability e
Consequently, existed utility privacy trade-off functions, which are given in [3, 4, 26],
are updated based on the proposition. For binary modeled attributes, the application
scenario is chosen as smart home scenario, since smart electronic households are
sending their binary working mode (on/off) to users. This information is needed
at user side with utility concern. However, it can lead to privacy leakage such as
surveillance cases if the distribution of information is investigated. Finally, normally
distributed attributes are studied with respect to the utility privacy trade-off. Similar
to the binary attributes, the trade-off constraints (p,u,l) are proposed as a function of
continuous system parameters source correlation rXhXr , distortion variance sD and
noise variance sN. As an application scenario, a smart hospital and body sensor
network scenario are jointly considered. In this scenario, monitored information of
patients (e.g. blood pressure, body temperature), which is the public attribute, send
to medical professions and this information is used for treatment, while this released
information is highly correlated with quasi identifier (e.g. age, height) and sensitive
information (e.g. previous health records), which is the hidden attribute.
The first and the main contribution is writing the utility privacy constraint as a function
of system parameters including the impacts of wireless channel. This proposition
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causes that utility and privacy trade-off functions are rewritten with respect to new
function form constraints. Then, the updated utility privacy trade-off expressions are
step by step derived for both binary and normally distributed attributes under the effects
of noisy channels. The theoretical part of the study, the upper and lower bounds for
the updated expressions are calculated and justified with simulations. As a output of
these functions, it is seen that privacy is increasing with increased noise for both type
of the sources. In other words, the channel noise is a reason of creating of distortion
in the communication system. Since these distortion sources are inevitable due to
inherent facts in communication systems (e.g. channel effects, coding theory), all
of these parameters (e.g. the source distribution, coding precision, channel error)
should be considered as design parameters for privacy preserving systems. With
the deployment of existing transmission methods, these parameters can be changed
in real time based on the necessity of utility and privacy levels. In order to satisfy
this real time communication with respect to the utility and privacy concerns, a
protocol should be decided between transmitter and receiver. Then possible privacy
preserving communication can be determined according to the decided protocol.
As a future work, this utility privacy trade-off can be investigated more deeply for
more complex communication systems, such as considering fading effects of the
wireless communication systems. Moreover, the analysis of the combination of
anonymization and utility privacy trade-off can be considered for the communication
systems. Another very important task is developing privacy preserving algorithms for
machine learning systems. The variety of possible studies can be rise with different
systems and approaches.
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APPENDIX A.1
Derivation of (5.10): If the equation (5.6) is considered, H(Xh|Xˆr) should be
calculated to measure privacy. In order to that, calculating Pr(Xh = Xˆr) is simpler
that calculating Pr(Xh 6= Xˆr), with respect to Pr(Xh 6= Xˆr) = 1 Pr(Xh = Xˆr). Then,
this probability can be computed by using cross probabilities of each step as:
Pr(Xh = Xˆr) = (1  p)(1  e)(1 d)+ pe(1 d)+ p(1  e)d+(1  p)ed (A.1)
= 1  (p+ e+d 2(pe+ ed+ pd)+4ped). (A.2)
So that, it can be seen that in Fig. 5.3a, the cross probability between Xh and Xˆr is
equal to (p+e+d 2(pe+ed+ pd)+4ped). It is known that the conditional entropy
can be written as the sum of conditional entropies for all possible conditions such that:
H(Xh|Xˆr) = H(Xh|Xˆr = Xh)+H(Xh|Xˆr 6= Xh). (A.3)
If H(X) = H(p) where X is a random variable with Pr(X = 1) = p, [1], then the
conditional entropy, and naturally (5.6) of the system can be written in terms of the
cross probability between Xh and Xˆr:
G(D) = G(p,d,e) = H(p+ e+d 2(pe+ ed+ pd)+4ped). (A.4)
Derivation of (5.11): Secondly, derivation of (5.7) is based on mutual information
definition given in (2.13). For DSBS, Xr can take values 0 or 1 with equal probabilities,
so that entropy of Xr is equal to one as follows:
Pr(Xr = 0) = Pr(Xr = 1) = 0.5, H(Xr) = 1. (A.5)
Similar to the finding of the expression of Pr(Xh = Xˆr), Pr(Xr = Xˆr) can also be found
with value of cross probability between Xr and Xˆr. This case is shown in Fig. 5.3b as
given:
Pr(Xr = Xˆr) = (1  e)(1 d)+ ed = 1  (e+d 2ed). (A.6)
Then the conditional entropy between Xr and Xˆr is found as H(Xr|Xˆr) = H(e+ d 
2ed). As a final step, these results can be used to find mutual information between Xr
and Xˆr in the following:
R(D,E) = R(d,e) = 1 H(e+d 2ed). (A.7)
Derivation of (5.12): Finally, the steps in the derivations of (5.6) and (5.7) can be
guided to derive (5.8). The mutual information between Xh and Xˆr is written as follows:
I(Xh; Xˆr) = H(Xh) H(Xh|Xˆr). (A.8)
It is known that the entropy equals 1 for DSBS. Based on the definitions, L(D) has a
linear relation with G(D) .After the calculations, I(Xh; Xˆr) is founded easily as follows:
L(D) = L(p,d,e) = 1 H(p+ e+d 2(pe+ ed+ pd)+4ped). (A.9)
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Derivation of (6.2): In [26], the equivocation distortion function G(D) is equal to
I(Xr,Xh; Xˆh) and it basically equals to:
I(Xr,Xh; Xˆh) = h(Xh,Xr)+h(Xˆh) h(Xr,Xh, Xˆr)
= h(Xr)+h(Xh|Xr)+h(Xˆr)  [h(Xr, Xˆr)+h(Xh|Xr, Xˆr)].
(A.10)
Here, it can be written as h(Xh|Xr, Xˆr) = h(Xh|Xr) due to the Markov property in joint
entropy (2.34). And the mutual information can be rewritten based on the Markov
property as follows:
= h(Xr)+h(Xh|Xr)+h(Xˆr)  [h(Xr, Xˆr)+h(Xh|Xr)]
= h(Xr)+h(Xˆr) h(Xr, Xˆr)
I(Xr,Xh; Xˆh) = I(Xr; Xˆr).
(A.11)
In order to determine I(Xr; Xˆr), conditional varianceVar(Xr|Xˆr) should be found since
conditional variance is needed for the calculation of h(Xr|Xˆr)= 12 log(2peVar(Xr|Xˆr))
[1] such that:
Var(Xr|Xˆr) = s2Xr(1 r2XrXˆr). (A.12)
where rXrXˆr =
E[XrXˆr]
sXrsXˆr
=
E[Xr(Xr+N)]
sXrsXˆr
=
sXr
sXˆr
, (A.13)
and D= s2Xr(1 
s2Xr
s2Xˆr
). (A.14)
It is clear that h(Xr) = 12 log(2pes
2
Xr) for Gaussian distributed Xr. Finally, R(D) =
I(Xr; Xˆr) is calculated as follows [26]:
R(D) = h(Xr) h(Xr|Xˆr) (A.15)
=
1
2
log(
s2Xr
s2Xr(1 
s2Xr
s2Xˆr
)
) =
1
2
log(
s2Xr
D
). (A.16)
Derivation of (6.1): In order to calculate this conditional differential entropy
h(Xh|Xˆr), h(Xh, Xˆr) should be calculated first based on (2.22). In this case,
h(Xh, Xˆr) = 12 log((2pe)
2|K|), where
K =
"
s2Xh rXhXˆrsXhsXˆr
rXhXˆrsXhsXˆr s
2
Xˆr
#
, (A.17)
|K|= (1 r2XhXˆr)s
2
Xhs
2
Xˆr
, (A.18)
rXhXˆr = rXhXrrXrXˆr . (A.19)
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From the definition of correlation between Xr and Xh, and between Xr and Xˆr given
in (A.13), (A.19) can be rewritten as follows:
rXhXˆr = rXhXr
sXr
sXˆr
. (A.20)
Now the equivocation distortion function G(D) is written as G(D) = h(Xh|Xˆr) =
h(Xh, Xˆr) h(Xˆr), where h(Xˆr) = 12 log(2pes2Xˆr). As a result it can be clearly written
that:
G(D) = 1
2
log(
(2pe)2(1 r2XhXr
s2Xr
s2Xˆr
)s2Xhs
2
Xˆr
2pes2Xˆr
), (A.21)
=
1
2
log(2pe(1 r2XhXr
s2Xr
s2Xˆr
)s2Xh). (A.22)
By substituting
s2Xr
s2Xˆr
with 1  Ds2Xh
, G(D) can be rewritten as:
G(D) = 1
2
log(2pes2Xh [(1 r2XhXr)+r2XhXrD/sX2r )). (A.23)
Derivation of (6.3): This step is very straightforward because of the linear relationship
between (6.1) and (6.3), which is:
I(Xh; Xˆr) = h(Xh) h(Xh|Xˆr), (A.24)
L(D) = h(Xh)) G(D). (A.25)
where h(Xh) equals to h(Xh) = 12 log(2pes
2
Xh). As a result of combination of (A.23)
and h(Xh), it is obvious that:
L(D) =
1
2
log(
1
[(1 r2XhXr)2)+r2XhXr)2D/sX2r ]
). (A.26)
Derivation of (6.10): According to the definitions of rate distortion equivocation
function in (3.9), maximization of I(Xr; Xˆr) should be done. In order to that
minimization of joint entropy h(Xr, Xˆr) and maximization of h(Xr) and h(Xˆr) will
be satisfied based on (2.20) and (2.22) as follows:
max(h(Xr)) =
1
2
log(2pes2Xr), (A.27)
max(h(Xˆr)) =
1
2
log(2pes2Xˆr), (A.28)
h(Xr, Xˆr) 12 log((2pe)
2|K1|). (A.29)
where Xr and Xˆr are Gaussian distributed, then the equality is satisfied in order to
find maximum. On the other hand, the joint distribution can not be bivariate normal
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distribution then h(Xr, Xˆr) is written with inequality where K1 is the covariance matrix
and |K1| is the determinant of K1:
K1 =
"
s2Xh rXhXˆrsXhsXˆr
rXhXˆrsXhsXˆr s
2
Xˆr
#
, (A.30)
|K1|= (1 r2XhXˆr)s
2
Xhs
2
Xˆr
, (A.31)
rXhXˆr = rXhWrWWˆrWˆXˆr , (A.32)
where
rXrW =
E[XrW]
sXrsW
=
E[Xr(Xr+D)]
sXrsW
=
sXr
sW
, (A.33)
rWWˆ =
E[WWˆ]
sWsWˆ
=
E[W(W+N)]
sWsWˆ
=
sW
sWˆ
, (A.34)
(A.35)
As a result of these equations, R(D,E) = R(rXhXr ,sD,sD) can be written as follows:
R(sD,sD,rXhXr) = I(Xr; Xˆr) 
1
2
log(
(2pe)2s2Xrs
2
Xˆr
(2pe)2s2Xrs
2
Xˆr
(1 r2XrXˆr)
) =
1
2
log(
1
(1 r2XrXˆr)
),
  1
2
log(
1
(1  (sXrsWˆ rWˆXˆr)
2)
) =
1
2
log(
s2Wˆ
s2Wˆ r2WˆXˆrs
2
Xr
).
(A.36)
where the variance equilibrium expressions can be rewritten such that s2Wˆ = s
2
W+s2N
and s2W = s2Xr +s
2
D according to Fig. 6.1b.
Derivation of (6.9): According to the main definition of (3.8), the minimization of
h(Xh|Xˆr) should be satisfied. It is known that h(Xh|Xˆr) = h(Xh, Xˆr)  h(Xˆr) so that
minimization can be done minimizing h(Xh, Xˆr) and maximizing h(Xˆr). Based on
the the equation (2.22), max(h(Xˆr)) = 12 log(2pes
2
Xr), where Xˆr is Gaussian. If the
minimization of h(Xh, Xˆr) is considered with (2.22), h(Xh|Xˆr) can be rewritten as
follows:
G(D) = h(Xh|Xˆr) 12 log((2pe)
2|K2|)  12 log(2pes
2
Xr). (A.37)
where K2 is covariance matrix and |K2| is the determinant of K2:
K2 =
"
s2Xh rXhXˆrsXhsXˆr
rXhXˆrsXhsXˆr s
2
Xˆr
#
, (A.38)
|K2|= (1 r2XhXˆr)s
2
Xhs
2
Xˆr
, (A.39)
rXhXˆr = rXhXrrXrWrWWˆrWˆXˆ, (A.40)
= rXhXr
sXr
sWˆ
rWˆXˆ. (A.41)
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It should be remembered that the equality in (A.37) can be satisfied only bivariate
normal distributed (Xh, Xˆr) pair. Then by substituting these terms, it can be written
that:
G(D) = G(rXhXr ,sD,sN) = h(Xh, Xˆr) h(Xˆr),
 1
2
log(
(2pe)2s2Xhs
2
Xˆr
(1 r2XhXrr2WˆXˆr
s2Xr
s2Xˆ
)
2pes2Xˆr
),
 1
2
log(2pes2Xh(1 r2XhXrr2WˆXˆr
s2Xr
s2Wˆ
).
(A.42)
where s2Wˆ = s
2
D+s2N+s2Xr according to Fig. 6.1b.
Derivation of (5.12): According to the definition of L(D) in (3.10), it has to be
maximized unlike G(rXhXr ,sD,sN) and it can be written as follows:
L(D) = I(Xh; Xˆr) = h(Xh) G(rXhXr ,sD,sN). (A.43)
When the inequality is considered for G(rXhXr ,sD,sN), the minimization of h(Xh, Xˆr)
creates greater or equal condition for L(rXhXr ,sD,sN). Then this derivation can be
easily done by combining h(Xr) = 12 log(2pes
2
Xr) and (A.42) such that:
L(D) = L(rXhXr ,sD,sN) 
1
2
log(
2pes2Xr
2pes2Xh(1 r2XhXrr2WˆXˆr
s2Xh
s2Wˆ
)
), (A.44)
  1
2
log(
1
1 r2XhXrr2WˆXˆr
s2Xh
s2Wˆ
). (A.45)
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Abstract
We present future scenarios for privacy attacks in CPS, which moti-
vate the development of novel system concepts. Especially in Smart Cities
the acquired sensor data is privacy-critical. In addition, also theoretical
foundations are given to quantify privacy. The topics security and privacy
are related, but not identical. In both security and secrecy, it is desired to
avoid reception of information by an eavesdropper. Privacy desires safety
of individual (private) information while providing a benefit through an
analysis of revealed data. In this article, we present a tutorial on informa-
tion theory and privacy metrics to quantify the privacy in an urban city
scenario. We discuss possible attacks on mobility traces and discuss the
metrics in a first simple anonymization approach based on k-anonymity
to avoid the re-identification of individuals in a smart city scenario.
Keywords: privacy, k-anonymity, mutual information, cyber-physical sys-
tems, location data.
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1 Social Perspective and Motivation
Privacy is a societally very relevant concept which can be formalized with math-
ematical tools of information theory. Today, private information about individ-
uals is distributed in multiple data bases (e.g., social networks). Even if a user
cares about anonymization (no name, no address), this will not completely pro-
tect individuals from being identified. Data can be combined and linked from
multiple sources and, therefore, an individual can be reidentified. To quantify
this risk, information theoretic measures are recently used in the literature. In
this article, we will investigate privacy from a mathematical-technical perspec-
tive and we also provide the societal definitions of privacy. Our long-term goal is
to provide a guideline for the design of e cient technical systems with improved
privacy.
In this article, we will firstly investigate mathematical metrics to define in-
dividual privacy. Beyond the technical approaches to privacy protection in gen-
eral, and the technical tradeo↵ between utility and privacy, the final perspective
of our research takes a social science perspective thus referring to the demands
and needs of users. Privacy is the right on protection of individuals’ personal
information (Patton; 2000). In social science, definitions like self-determination
(Westin; 1970), right to be let alone (Warren and Brandeis; 1890), limited ac-
cess (Gavison; 1980), are used to link privacy to individual demands in society.
These societal definitions do not explain privacy in the physical and mathemat-
ical terms, therefore an extended definition is required to define the privacy also
in the information technologies (Raab et al.; 2011). The term self-determination
defines the right of individuals to enclose or to disclose their personal informa-
tion. For this term, technical computer systems with improved privacy can be
designed. Often used methods to improve privacy for cloud systems are based
on encryption methods (Dong et al.; 2013).
Another social definition of privacy is called the co-ownership, where a sec-
ond person is the co-owner of the private information of a person. This assumes
that the person shares his/her private information with other persons (Petronio;
2010). This behavior presumes trust to other persons. In our article, we also
consider a similar approach in one of our attacks on privacy (see Attack 4) .
Confidentiality, anonymity, self-determination, freedom of expression, as well
as individual control of data are essential components in this context (Arning
and Ziefle; 2015). The seamless integration of technology and digital services
into our living spaces necessitates an understanding of the impact of invisible
technology for residents. Sensitive and detailed information regarding various
topics is available everywhere and anytime. Decision makers in education, poli-
tics, and business may use this information in real time. Thus, current develop-
ments require a high acceptance and impose high responsibility to all persons
and organizations involved: users, decision makers, technical designers, but also
industry, economics and legislation (Adams; 1999), (Arning et al.; 2010).
Especially, in the context of a smart-city scenario, in which many digital
services are used, the perceived privacy and the knowledge about the way data
are handled are highly important issues for technology acceptance (Van Heek
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et al.; 2015). Moreover, the usage of technology in a smart city is increasingly
less voluntary and often vital, e.g. in case of life-saving medical technology, but
also in case of tra c technology or crime surveillance technology. Technology
acceptance, the broad willingness of persons to rely and trust technology, the
perceived benefits and individual fears of violating intimacy and privacy are
serious issues which have to be handled with care (Ziefle and Schaar; 2014),
(Lalou; 2010).
What may be useful for the public, for example, security in tra c by vehicle-
to-infrastructure technologies might not be acceptable for the individual, which
declines continuous monitoring (Schmidt et al.; 2015a), (Schmidt et al.; 2015b).
Also, what may be useful for a chronically ill person might not be acceptable for
a healthy individual (Wilkowska and Ziefle; 2012). Likewise, video surveillance
in cities in times of urgent crime defense is highly desirable for residents though
not tolerable as a permanent infrastructure (Van Heek et al.; 2015). Thus
decisions about privacy protection can only be drawn on a multi-perspective-
basis keeping in mind both positive societal consequences, as productivity, new
services, mobility and growth, but also private negative e↵ects, as violations of
privacy, security concerns, infrastructure constraints and user distrust (Fogel
and Nehmad; 2009).
What is needed is a novel methodological approach that allows modeling
the privacy ”good” from di↵erent perspectives within one design space and
that enables designers to anticipate and predict the consequences of a technical
development on di↵erent levels. So far, mostly technical (in terms of feasibility)
criteria are considered together with legal constraints (specifically in how far
data collection might conflict with the law). Beyond the normative perspective
according to which humans do have the basic right to privacy - users’ situational
perspective and their technology acceptance depending on social contexts are yet
not integrated into the definition of privacy. Characteristically, social acceptance
must be modeled as a ”product” of perceived usage motives that militate in
favor of and against technology as well as situation-specific evaluations, driven
by individual needs and demands (Ziefle et al.; 2016). In short: Acceptance
research has to reflect the fragile trade-o↵ between benefits and barriers ascribed
to a technology. Critical questions in this context are:
• How can we model the utility of a technology based on acceptance data?
• How can we model the utility (safety, e ciency) based on user demands?
• Can we find new metrics for the utility-privacy trade-o↵ based on individ-
ual needs?
Recently, attempts have been made to develop such interdisciplinary method-
ologies to capture technology acceptance in complex technology developments
(Kowalewski et al.; 2013). In all phases of the technical development users’ de-
mands and requirements towards the usage and design of digital services need
to be captured and iteratively implemented into the technical design.
In computer and communication sciences, privacy is a new concept and
should be distinguished from the term secrecy. Secrecy is a very old research
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field, where the information theoretic foundations are already presented 1949 by
the seminal work of Shannon (Shannon; 1949). In secrecy, we desire that specific
information can not be received by untrusted third parties (e.g. eavesdroppers).
In contrary, privacy measures the safety of individual information while pro-
viding a so-called benefit or utility (Sankar et al.; 2010). The concept of secrecy
allows to distinguish between private and public data. Consequently, secrecy )
privacy, however the reversed direction is not valid. On the one hand, the pri-
vacy increases if the publication of data is reduced or if data is anonymized. On
the other hand, the utility increases by publishing more data. Consequently,
privacy is a trade-o↵ between these two extreme cases. The concept of pri-
vacy targets a minimization of the disclosure of private information and jointly
targets the maximization of the utility of the public data.
For the development of new metrics to quantify privacy in Smart City appli-
cations, such as cyber-physical systems, we will present a tutorial on informa-
tion theoretic metrics. These metrics are useful to measure the anonymization
of data and therefore, also important for new algorithms with enhanced privacy
in CPS.
1.1 Motivation
The evolution of cities to so-called Smart Cities is driven by the progress in
wireless communications and sensor networks. Sensors are used to collect as
much information, e.g., a intersection or a street, as possible (see Figure 1).
On one hand, this information can be used to enhance the e ciency of the
tra c or to improve the safety. On the other hand, this enormous amount of
data will compromise the privacy of the people in a Smart City. If privacy
is not given, these systems will be probably not accepted. In future, there
will be a dense network of nodes with, e.g. sensors sensing the tra c in a
city to control and monitor the tra c. Cameras may cause the problem of
identification of individuals by simple classification algorithms. However, even
simpler techniques, such as radar, still have privacy problems.
For example, in such a scenario it would be possible to detect di↵erent users
by e.g., their Bluetooth signals. A city could then monitor the tra c by counting
the Bluetooth devices (Gurczik et al.; 2012). With additional radar or ultra-
sonic sensors, it would be even possible to distinguish di↵erent participants, e.g,
cars, buses, or pedestrians.
Even if we do not encounter any identification by a camera, a system might
be able with the help of other data bases to identify the detected users. Assum-
ing a smart sensor node with a Bluetooth detector is able to detect the ID of
a user. Hence, with multiple of these devices, it would be possible to track the
route a user is taking to his work every day (de Montjoye et al.; 2013). Thus,
the system knows where a person lives and where he/she is working, and further
how long he/she is working during the week. We have several quasi-identifiers
in this data base: The first one is the location of his home, the second one is
the work, and the third one is the time. With other data bases, e.g., data bases
from the employer, it would be possible to identify a specific person. Hence, the
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employer can get the name behind the ID if he gets the tracked data from the
Smart City.
This causes several harms for a user. A sensitive attribute is the route a user
is taking every morning. An employer could find out if an employee is actually
at home for, e.g., home-o ce, or whether he is somewhere else. If the employer
knows the name behind the Bluetooth ID, he also knows where the employee is
in his free time.
Consequently, we are facing the trade-o↵ between utility (safety, e ciency)
and privacy. In this article, we will consider a special concept to track users in a
city based on, e.g., their Bluetooth identifiers (IDs). We will explain all concepts
and metrics with this scenario. We will start with a number of possible attacks
to identify users based on given information. Then, we will introduce counter-
measures to avoid these privacy attacks. The privacy, which is an individual
measure, is quantified by information-theoretic metrics.
1.2 Scenario
Let us now introduce the scenario which is used as a tutorial for all concepts
explained in this paper. Figure 1 presents an example of a localization within
a Smart City. The utility in our scenarios is the collection of statistics for an
optimization of the tra c within a city. However, this collection of data results
in privacy risks for individuals. Let us consider a system, which identifies users
based on Bluetooth IDs. Those systems are already used in prototypes (Gurczik
et al.; 2012).
In the literature, many scenarios with location information are investigated,
(Beresford and Stajano; 2003; de Montjoye et al.; 2013; Shokri et al.; 2011).
In (de Montjoye et al.; 2013), the authors investigate a scenario similar to our
scenario. They have showed, that the uniqueness of human mobility is high
(de Montjoye et al.; 2013). Hence, it is possible to re-identify an individual,
by the top-locations, e.g., the home address and the work address. In this
article, we will additionally present privacy metrics which can be applied to this
scenario. A famous metric, the k-anonymity is based on databases which may
be available at the home and at the work address.
Cars can have one or multiple Bluetooth devices, therefore, we can use their
IDs to distinguish between di↵erent cars. Street lights or signs can be equipped
with Bluetooth receivers (in what follows, we will call these receivers sensor
nodes) and be interconnected over a wireless backhaul network, which is a key
aspect in a Smart City. The Bluetooth receiver in the sensor nodes (the terms
sensors and nodes are used interchangeably here) can detect a Bluetooth devices
in the vicinity. Based on this information, a car with a Bluetooth device can be
simply tracked if we have a network of Bluetooth receivers within a smart city.
From a first perspective, such a system looks like a privacy-preserving sys-
tem, because only an ID is tracked and nothing else. The system does not know
the name or the address of the driver of the car. However, a very simple attack
already allows to identify the address of the driver in some cases:
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Figure 1: Scenario: A distributed sensor network with di↵erent locations and
routes
Attack 1. If a driver always uses the same route per day, i.e., he starts in the
morning at sensor 1 continues until he reaches sensor n and in the evening the
driver takes the opposite way, then we can simply identify the address of the
home and the work of the driver (without name).
Let us regard Figure 1. In this case, we can simply identify for a specific
Bluetooth ID the home and the work address. Here, the home address is at
sensor node 1 and the work address is at sensor node 5. The next attack is
possible if we additionally know the names at, e.g., node 5. This could be the
case if at node 5 is, e.g., a large research institute with a website where all names
of the researchers are listed.
Attack 2. Consider the setting of Attack 1. If we additionally know the list of
names at the final node (e.g. work), we can identify the list of home addresses
of all names in this list.
Now, we still do not know which address belongs to which name. This
situation changes, if we also get a list of names of individuals at the home
addresses. Such data is already online by telephone directories. Consequently,
the next attack is:
Attack 3. Consider the setting of Attack 2. If we additionally know the list of
names of individuals living at di↵erent home addresses, we can possibly identify
the person.
In our example, we could possibly identify two users living at node 1 and
node 8 if we get their address by an online telephone directory and if both work
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at node 5. With Attack 3 we can now link a name to a specific Bluetooth ID.
Then the system is able to track this person at every location where sensor
nodes can detect the Bluetooth ID. This is obviously a situation which leads
to a violation of the individual privacy. Even if a person is careful by avoiding
to be listed in a public telephone directory, it is still possible to identify these
individuals if many other people have careless handling of their private data.
This idea leads to following attack:
Attack 4. Consider the setting of Attack 2. If there are some individuals
within the lists with full names and addresses, we can possibly identify also
other individuals in the list.
Going back to the social definitions: In our technical system we consequently
also consider the self-determination and co-owner problems. The first assump-
tion is that each individual in our scenario does not want to share his/her
personal information with anyone else. And the second one is the co-owner of
the private information is completely trustful. Therefore, the privacy problem
is narrowed a little more for understanding it within information technologies
after these assumptions. In this article, we want to present engineers di↵erent
metrics to quantify the risk of re-identification by future cyber-physical systems.
The term privacy is connected to information about data sets and especially pri-
vacy is related to mutual information between di↵erent data sets. Therefore,
we will give a tutorial on di↵erent information-theoretic metrics to quantify the
privacy risks in our attacks. We will start with a introduction of the mutual
information and we will introduce individual metrics which are more relevant
for quantifying the privacy risks.
2 Information Theoretic Privacy Measures
In this paper, we give an overview of useful metrics to quantify the so-called
disclosure risk based on information theoretic concepts. The information theo-
retic definition of mutual information is a well known method to quantify the
information of a random variable about another random variable (Cover and
Thomas; 2006). In contrast to mutual information, privacy is connected to an
individual (Bezzi; 2010). In this section, we will present a tutorial on informa-
tion theoretic metrics and theorems which are useful to quantify the knowledge
about individuals. We consider only discrete random variables X with alpha-
bets X and with probability mass functions p(x) = Pr{X = x}, x 2 X (Cover
and Thomas; 2006).
2.1 Information Theoretic Foundations
A measure of uncertainty of a random variable X is the entropy.
H(X) =  
X
x2X
p(x) log(p(x)) (1)
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The function p(x) denotes the probability mass function of the random vari-
able. This measure can be extended to the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler
distance (KLD), which can be seen as the distance between two distributions.
Definition 1. Kullback-Leibler distance(Cover and Thomas; 2006): The rela-
tive entropy (distance) between two probability mass functions p(x) and q(x) is
defined as
D(p||q) =
X
x2X
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
= Ep{log p(X)
q(X)
}. (2)
Here, Ep denotes the expectation operator. The well known equation for the
mutual information I(X,Y ) is the measure of information between two statisti-
cal variables (Cover and Thomas; 2006) and it is the basis for the following well
known measure leading to the privacy risk measures.
Definition 2. Mutual information(Cover and Thomas; 2006): Consider two
random variables X and Y with a joint probability mass function p(x, y) and
marginal probability mass functions p(x) and p(y). The mutual information
I(X;Y ) is the relative entropy between the joint distribution p(x, y) and the
product distribution p(x)p(y)
I(X;Y ) = D(p(x, y)||p(x)p(y))
=
X
x2X
X
y2Y
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
. (3)
The definition of surprise, which is an important metric to quantify privacy,
is based on the definition of the mutual information based on the KLD. We can
further rephrase the mutual information to:
I(X;Y ) =
X
x2X
p(x)D(p(y|x)||p(y)) (4)
The interested reader can find the derivation in Appendix A. The mutual in-
formation can be also expressed in terms of entropy, as in Eq. (1).
I(X;Y ) = H(Y ) H(Y |X) (5)
The derivation is given in Appendix B. By using the derivation of Appendix C,
the mutual information can be also expressed in terms of entropies conditioned
on x:
I(X;Y ) =  
X
x2X
p(x)
"X
y2Y
p(y|x) log(p(y)) H(Y |x)
#
.
With the following corollary, we can express the mutual information as an av-
erage value over one symbol specific information.
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Corollary 1. Let X 2 X and Y 2 Y be two random variables and let p(y|x)
be the conditional probability distribution of Y given X, p(y) be the probability
distribution of Y and p(x) be the probability distribution of p(x), then we have:
H(Y ) =
X
x2X
p(x)
X
y2Y
p(y|x) log(p(y)) (6)
Proof: See Appendix D. Mutual information is an average value, e.g., it
is the average value of the KLD between the joint distribution p(x, y) and the
product distribution p(x)p(y), or as shown above it is an average value of the
entropies. However, privacy is an individual concept (Bezzi; 2010). In what
follows the basic metrics for the privacy measures can be derived with the above
defined mutual information.
2.2 Surprise and Specific Information
The mutual information in terms of the Kullback-Leibler distance (see Section
2.1) is the average value of the surprise in terms of X. The surprise or j-measure
is defined as the single symbol contribution of the mutual information (Bezzi;
2010). It is given as the relative distance between the distribution p(y) and
the conditional distribution p(y|x). Later we will see that we can calculate the
individual privacy based on the specific information.
Definition 3. Surprise(Bezzi; 2010): The j-measure is defined as the KLD
between the marginal distribution p(y) and the conditional distribution p(y|x)
I1(x, Y ) = D(p(y|x)||p(y)). (7)
Corollary 2. (Bezzi; 2010) Comparing (7) with (18) it is obvious that
I(X;Y ) =
X
x2X
p(x)I1(x, Y ). (8)
Hence, the mutual information can be seen as the expected surprise. The
mutual information in terms of entropy is the expected value of the specific
information or i-measure.
Definition 4. Specific information(Bezzi; 2010): The i-measure is defined as
the reduction of entropy between the marginal distribution p(y) and the condi-
tional probability p(y|x)
I2(x, Y ) = H(Y ) H(Y |x). (9)
Corollary 3. It is obvious that the specific information averages to the mutual
information
I(X;Y ) =
X
x2X
p(x)I2(x, Y ).
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Proof.
I(X;Y ) =
X
x2X
p(x)
X
y2Y
p(y) log(p(y)) 
X
x2X
p(x)H(Y |x).
Due to
P
x2X p(x) = 1, we get I(X;Y ) =
P
x2X p(x)I2(x, Y ).
Both metrics (I1(x, Y ) and I2(x, Y )) average to the mutual information
(Bezzi; 2010). The question is: Are both metrics equivalent? Hence I1(x, Y ) =
I2(x, Y )? For the surprise metric and for a given X = x we get from (7)
I1(x, Y ) =
X
y2Y
p(y|x) log p(y|x)
p(y)
=  
X
y2Y
p(y|x) log(p(y)) 
0@ X
y2Y
p(y|x) log(p(y|x))
1A
=  
X
y2Y
p(y|x) log(p(y)) H(Y |x), (10)
and the specific information is defined as
I2(x, Y ) =  
X
y2Y
p(y) log(p(y)) H(Y |x). (11)
Consequently, both measures are equivalent in average.
3 Privacy Models and Protection
In this article, we will present the information theoretic measures to quantify
the k-anonymization method. In addition to k-anonymity, we will also present
an overview on additional superior approaches at the end of this section.
Data can be presented in tables. A row corresponds to a tuple (individual)
and is the data record. A column in a data table corresponds to an attribute.
We can formally define:
Definition 5. Attributes(Sweeney; 2002): Let T (A1, . . . , An) be a table with a
finite number of tuples. The set of attributes of T are {A1, . . . , An}.
In the literature, e.g.,(Bezzi; 2010) data is presented in tables and categorized
into di↵erent types:
• Identifier (e.g. name)
• Quasi-identifier can be used to identify a user (e.g. postal code, age, gen-
der)
• Sensitive information (e.g. diseases). Information which must be kept
secret.
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To minimize the disclosure of information multiple anonymization methods can
be used, e.g. random perturbation or even complete erasure of quasi-identifiers.
However, these methods jointly decrease the quality of the data, and therefore,
the utility (Bezzi; 2010). Quasi-identifier are important in the concept of pri-
vacy because they contain attributes which in combination identify individuals
(Sweeney; 2002). In (Machanavajjhala et al.; 2006), the quasi-identifiers are
defined as a set of non-sensitive attributed which can be linked with external
data to uniquely identify at least one individual.
Definition 6. Quasi-identifier(Sweeney; 2002): Given a population of entries
U , an entry-specific table T (A1, . . . , An), two mappings g : T ! V and f :
U ! T with U ✓ V. A quasi-identifier of T , written QT , is a set of attributes
{Ai, . . . , Aj} ✓ {A1, . . . , An} where: 9xi 2 U such that
xi = g(f(xi)). (12)
Table 1: Example: The left table shows the true data. The right table gives
the data after anonymization. The attribute assigned to X can denote the ZIP
which is a quasi-identifier.
Name X Y Name X˜ Y
Hendrik 2445 n ** > 2000 n
Gunes 2350 n ** > 2000 n
Martina 1214 y **  2000 y
Volker 1226 y **  2000 y
   
U
V
T
f
g
⇤ ⇤
g
Figure 2: Illustration of Definition 6.
Figure 2 illustrates the definition of quasi-identifiers. With quasi-identifiers,
users can be identified. An anonymization method should reduce the informa-
tion in two data sets given by the random variables X and X˜ = G(X) where
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G(·) can be a deterministic or a random function. Regard Table 1. This very
simple example shows the credit rating of customers of a bank. The variable
X 2 R+ denotes the monthly salary and the variable Y 2 {N,Y } indicates
whether a person is credit worthy. Obviously, the privacy is improved and the
utility is reduced.
3.1 k-anonymity
The concept of k-anonymity is very relevant for Internet data which can be
combined and linked. A person, believing his data is anonymized in the inter-
net, can be re-identified if all information is linked together (see current news
about NSA, Google, etc.). If data with sensitve private information should be
shared to, e.g., researcher, the data should not provide any private information,
hence no individual should be re-identified by the data. In his seminal work
(Sweeney; 2002), Sweeney introduced the k-anonymity model which provides
anonymization such that an individual can not be distingueshed from at least
k   1 individuals. In his seminal work Sweeney gives a formal definition of
k-anonymity:
Definition 7. k-anonymity(Sweeney; 2002): Let T be a table with and QT be
the quasi-identifier associated with it. T is said to satisfy k-anonymity if and
only if each sequence of values in T [QT ] appears with at least k occurances in
T [QT ].
Sweeney also proved the following lemma:
Lemma 1. (Sweeney; 2002) Let T (A1, . . . , An) be a table, QT = {Ai, . . . , Aj} be
the quasi-identifier associated with the table T with {Ai, . . . , Aj} ✓ {A1, . . . , An}
and T satisfy k-anonymity. Then, each sequence of values in T (Ax) appears
with at least k occurences in T [QT ] for x = i, . . . , j.
The proof is straightforward. Regard Table 2. Table T with the quasi-
identifiers QT satisfies k-anonymity and it is easy to see that each value asso-
ciated to QT , e.g., x occurs at least k = 2 times. We can also use information
theoretic methods to quantify k-anonymity. In (Bezzi; 2010), Bezzi used the
following information-theoretic measure:
Definition 8. (Bezzi; 2010) Let x˜ be an anonymized database with a single group
of quasi-identifier with Nx˜ records in the original table X. The probability to
re-identify a record x of the original table given the anonymized record x˜ is given
by p(x|x˜) and the k-anonymity is then defined by
H(X|x˜)   log(k) (13)
for each x˜ 2 X˜.
Corollary 4. (Bezzi; 2010) Let N be the number of tuples in the original dataset
X and let X˜ be the anonymized dataset with k-anonymity, then the upper bound
of the mutual information is
I(X; X˜)  log
✓
N
k
◆
. (14)
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Table 2: Example: k-anonymity with k = 2. The quasi-identifier QT =
{A1, A2, A3, A4} in the table appear at least k = 2 times. E.g, T1[QT ] = T3[QT ],
T2[QT ] = T4[QT ], and T5[QT ] = T6[QT ] = T7[QT ]
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
T1 w x y z a
T2 n m o p b
T3 w x y z b
T4 n m o p a
T5 f g h i a
T6 f g h i b
T7 f g h i c
Proof. (Bezzi; 2010)
For each x˜ 2 X˜, the specific information I2 according to Definition 4 is
I2(X, x˜) = H(X) H(X|x˜). (15)
According to the Definition 8, the conditioned entropy H(X|x˜) is bounded by:
H(X|x˜)   log(k) = log(k)  log(1)
, H(X|x˜)  log(1)  log(k) = log
✓
1
k
◆
and we have
I2(X, x˜) = H(X) + ( H(X|x˜))  H(X) + log
✓
1
k
◆
,
having N tuples in the original table with p(x) = 1/N and
H(X) =  
NX
i=1
1/N log(1/N) =   log(1/N) = log(N).
Consequently, averaging (15) over X results in (14).
The k-anonymization is not a perfect method to avoid attacks on individual
privacy, because there exists also attacks on k-anonymity. Two attacks homo-
geneity attack and background knowledge attack are discussed in (Machanava-
jjhala et al.; 2006) and lead to the l-diversity. The interested reader can use
Table 3 which summarizes further methods beyond l-diversity and provide meth-
ods against possible attacks.
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Table 3: Overview of additional anonymization approaches beyond k-anoymity.
Paper Privacy Algorithm or
Method
Metric
(Machanavajjhala
et al.; 2006)
Attacks on k-
anonymity homo-
geneity and back-
ground knowledge
attack are investi-
gated
To avoid an at-
tack, the sensitive
attributes in an
equivalence class
must be l-diverse.
Entropy l-
diversity, Bayes-
Optimal Privacy
(Li and Ye; 2007) Q&S Diversity:
specified version
of l-diversity.
Multi Diversity is
satisfied if each
sensitive informa-
tion satisfies Q&S
Diversity.
Two- Step general-
ization algorithm:
1) Generalization
of quasi identifiers,
2) Produce final
dataset by per-
forming masking
sensitive attribute
idea
Information loss
metric: (?) To-
tal information
loss due to gen-
eralizations will
be computed by
summing up a
normalization in-
formation loss for
each of attributes
(Li et al.; 2007) t-closeness: the
distance between
the distribution
of a sensitive
attribute in an
equivalence class
and distribution
of an attribute in
whole table is no
more than t.
In addition to
k-anonymity
and l-diversity
conditions, each
equivalence class
in a table must
t-closeness.
The t distance is
given by Earth
Mover’s Distance
(EMD). Further
metrics: varia-
tional distance,
Kullback-Leibler
distance.
(Aggarwal; 2005) k-anonymity
and k-
indistinguishability,
high dimension-
ality on privacy
preserving data
mining algorithms
Axis-parallel gen-
eralization and
clustering tech-
niques, which are
used for satisfying
k-anonymity
Euclidian distance
is used for measure
information loss
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Table 4: Home ZIP Codes are anonymized by using 3-anonymity
Name Forename Home Anonymized Specific
ZIP Home ZIP Information
Bauer Marc 56423 56400 2,322
Becker Margit 43420 43300 2,322
Fischer Robin 43359 43300 2,322
Franke Petra 56487 56400 2,322
Klein Saskia 56235 56200 2,322
Meyer Sabine 56656 56600 2,322
Mueller Franziska 56231 56200 2,322
Mueller Thorsten 56654 56600 2,322
Richter Robert 68541 68500 2,322
Sauer Monika 56639 56600 2,322
Schmitt Karl 56421 56400 2,322
Schneider Phillip 43365 43300 2,322
Wagner Arnold 68544 68500 2,322
Weber Johannes 68523 68500 2,322
Wolf Rainer 56232 56200 2,322
Mutual
Information
2,322
4 Smart-City Scenario: System Perspective
In this section, we will present the e↵ect of anonymization by evaluating the
previously introduced metrics. Attack 3 has been implemented in MATLAB by
attacking both the raw table data and the anonymized data sets. In case of
raw data as well as for the data in which we anonymized the ZIP codes, this
algorithm knows that a certain Bluetooth ID starts at a certain location and
stops at a certain location, both represented by two ZIP codes used by the attack
to create a list of persons living at the first ZIP and working at the second ZIP.
By performing an intersection between these two lists this algorithm allocates
the given Bluetooth ID to a list of possible names growing, the more the lists
are anonymized. Regarding Tables 4 - 6, an algorithm using Attack 3 could
generate the following output.
4.1 Attack without anonymization
An algorithm, can use, e.g., the knowledge that the Bluetooth ID 79855452
starts at ZIP 43359 and stops at ZIP 43351. This algorithm also knows the list
of people living at ZIP 43359 and the list of people working at ZIP 43351. Hence
according to Attack 3, this algorithms now tries to allocate the Bluetooth ID to
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Table 5: Work ZIP Codes are anonymized by using 3-anonymity
Name Forename Home Anonymized Specific
ZIP Work ZIP Information
Bauer Marc 56421 56400 2,322
Becker Margit 43326 43300 2,322
Fischer Robin 43351 43300 2,322
Franke Petra 56441 56400 2,322
Klein Saskia 56231 56200 2,322
Meyer Sabine 56689 56600 2,322
Mueller Franziska 56255 56200 2,322
Mueller Thorsten 56651 56600 2,322
Richter Robert 68544 68500 2,322
Sauer Monika 56665 56600 2,322
Schmitt Karl 56423 56400 2,322
Schneider Phillip 43357 43300 2,322
Wagner Arnold 68549 68500 2,322
Weber Johannes 68525 68500 2,322
Wolf Rainer 56233 56200 2,322
Mutual
Information
2,322
a person from the lists. In this case, the Bluetooth ID 79855452 could belong
to one of the following persons:
{Robin Fischer}
The result is unequivocal, the attack was successful.
4.2 Attack with anonymization of the ZIP
Now let us start with the first countermeasure. We now anonymize the work
ZIP, see Table 5. This algorithm will now work as follows: With the reduced
knowledge that the Bluetooth ID 79855452 starts at ZIP 43300 and stops at
ZIP 43300. Now the list of people working at ZIP 43300 is increased. Hence,
according to the Attack 3, this algorithm now tries to allocate the Bluetooth ID
to a person from the lists. The Bluetooth ID 79855452 could belong to one of
the following 3 Persons:
{Margit Becker, Phillip Schneider, Robin Fischer}
The attack is no longer successful after anonymization.
As we can see by this simple countermeasure, the set of possible persons is
increased by anonymization. Now let us discuss the information loss due to the
anonymization. As presented in Corollary 4 the specific information is bounded
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Table 6: Bluetooth IDs are anonymized by using 3-anonymity
Name Forename Bluetooth Anonymized Specific
ID Bluetooth ID Information
Bauer Marc 88954211 88954000 1,907
Becker Margit 88954415 88954000 1,907
Fischer Robin 79855452 79855000 1,907
Franke Petra 54125985 54125000 1,907
Klein Saskia 79855214 79855000 1,907
Meyer Sabine 79855652 79855000 1,907
Mueller Franziska 23154685 23154000 2,322
Mueller Thorsten 79855352 79855000 1,907
Richter Robert 54125468 54125000 1,907
Sauer Monika 88954874 88954000 1,907
Schmitt Karl 88954854 88954000 1,907
Schneider Phillip 54125487 54125000 1,907
Wagner Arnold 23154895 23154000 2,322
Weber Johannes 23154412 23154000 2,322
Wolf Rainer 5415125 54125000 1,907
Mutual
Information
1,99
by (Bezzi; 2010):
I2(X, x˜) = H(X) + ( H(X|x˜))  H(X) + log
✓
1
k
◆
.
Having N tuples in the original table with p(x) = 1/N
H(X) =  
NX
i=1
1/N log(1/N) =   log(1/N) = log(N) = log(15) ⇡ 3.907.
Having Nx˜ records of anonymized ZIP numbers, the probability of re-identifying
a record x˜ is given by p(X | x˜) = 1/Nx˜ (Bezzi; 2010). This is simple: Consider
the ZIP code 43300. With this knowledge the persons who can be re-identified
belong to the set {Margit Becker, Phillip Schneider, Robin Fischer}. Hence, we
have three persons, consequently, the probability p(X | x˜) = 1/Nx˜ = 1/3. In
the example of Table 5, for all x˜, the number of records is Nx˜ = 3, hence the
entropy is
 H(X|x˜) = log
✓
1
k
◆
⇡ 1.585.
Hence the result is I2(X, x˜) = H(X)   H(X|x˜) = log(N/k) ⇡ 2.322. The
mutual information is the expected value of the specific information which is in
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this case simply the same value. Actually the anonymization of the ZIP codes
are only a theoretical option, as we know that the addresses can be simply often
obtained from the Internet.
4.3 Attack with anonymization of the Bluetooth ID
The second countermeasure is based on an anonymization of the Bluetooth ID,
see Table 6. The output of the algorithm will then be: We try to allocate the
anonymized Bluetooth ID 79855000 to its owner.
Comparing the names of people with this ID, Attack 3 returns a list of possible
results. The Bluetooth ID 79855000 could belong to one of the following 4
persons:
{Robin Fischer, Sabine Meyer, Saskia Klein, Thorsten Mueller}
The attack is no longer successful after anonymization.
In this case, we have now di↵erent values of specific information. E.g, the
ID 88954000 can belong to 4 persons, hence, I2(X, x˜) = log(N/k) = log(N/4) ⇡
1.907. The other values are calculated in the same way. Regarding the two
countermeasures, we can see that the anonymization of the Bluetooth ID re-
sults in a smaller mutual information. Hence, we have a better reduction of
private information. We can also observe a higher average distortion in this
case. Actually, the Bluetooth ID is an information which can be directly influ-
enced by the technical system by an direct anonymization of this ID. The result
is reduced private information about people using tools of this Smart City sce-
nario. However, a reduced information of the Bluetooth ID, could also a↵ect
the system utility, as we want to locate cars in city in order to improve the
prediction of the tra c. Therefore, we have to find a trade-o↵ between privacy
and utility.
5 Conclusions and Outlook
This article presents a tutorial on possible metrics to quantify privacy enhancing
methods in cyber-physical systems. We have shown that already k-anonymity
can improve the privacy in systems with location data-bases and the information
loss can be simply quantified with metrics like mutual information. A future re-
search should investigate how attacks on k-anonymity in this scenario still allow
a re-identification of individuals additional information, such as homogeneity or
background knowledge attacks.
A further interesting research question is: How much anonymization is pos-
sible such that the location data can be used, e.g., for tra c management. This
leads to the privacy-utility trade-o↵ which can be quantified with information
theoretic metrics (Sankar et al.; 2010). This trade-o↵ is in interesting research
question for future research. Di↵erent questions need to be discussed here. How
can we model the utility (safety, e ciency) in our scenario? How can we quan-
tify the utility/privacy trade-o↵ also from a users’ perspective? In this context
input from the social sciences and empirical modeling is necessary. The trade-o↵
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between utility (of sharing data) and privacy (keeping data) might be di↵erent
from the technical perspective and the users’ perspective. From social science
research we know that users’ digital behaviors follow social laws rather than
technical risks. Even though users might be concerned when asked about the
fear of losing their privacy they nevertheless they are not at all careful with
their personal data when using digital services (Kowalewski et al.; 2015; Lalou;
2010). This phenomenon is called privacy paradox (Awad and Krishnan; 2006;
Norberg et al.; 2007). In addition, the factual (i.e. technical) risk of privacy
loss is not identical with the perceived risk of privacy loss and the perception of
control (Spiekermann; 2005). Users often have a di↵erent perception of dangers
and caveats and a di↵erent need of control than the factual danger might be.
The human decision to share or protect data is influenced by individual evalua-
tions: E.g., users could decide to take the risk of data sharing as users perceive
to be in control. Likewise, users might decide to share data because the tem-
porary benefit is higher for them than the potential risk. Understanding digital
behaviors and privacy concerns requires also the understanding of the respective
situation and culture (Hargittai; 2007) as well as individual factors, as e.g. the
level of knowledge about factual risks and malpractice as well as their digital
competency (Akhter; 2014). Furthermore, users’ age (Fogel and Nehmad; 2009;
Freestone and Mitchell; 2004) and gender (Kennedy et al.; 2003; Thelwall et al.;
2010) also influences the trade-o↵ between utility and privacy.(Ziefle et al.; 2016)
From this it follows that the users’ inherent metric of the utility-privacy tradeo↵
might be a valuable addendum to the technical metrics and should be integrated
into the technical metrics in future approaches.
Future research will have to further develop the tradeo↵ between utility and
privacy by integrating users’ perception in order to provide a holistic method-
ology which reflects technical and social perspectives on privacy.
A Derivation of the mutual information based
on the KLD
With p(x, y) = p(y|x)p(x) we can further rephrase the mutual information to:
I(X;Y ) =
X
x2X
X
y2Y
p(x, y) log
p(y|x)
p(y)
(16)
=
X
x2X
X
y2Y
p(y|x)p(x) log p(y|x)
p(y)
=
X
x2X
p(x)
X
y2Y
p(y|x) log p(y|x)
p(y)
(17)
=
X
x2X
p(x)D(p(y|x)||p(y)) (18)
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B Derivation of the mutual information in terms
of entropy
Equation (16) can be rephrased to (Cover and Thomas; 2006)
I(X;Y ) = 
X
x2X
X
y2Y
p(x, y) log(p(y))
+
X
x2X
X
y2Y
p(x, y) log(p(y|x)) (19)
= 
X
y2Y
p(y) log(p(y))
 
0@ X
x2X
X
y2Y
p(x, y) log(p(y|x))
1A (20)
=H(Y ) H(Y |X), (21)
where we use the law of total expectation p(y) =
P
x2X p(x, y) to simplifyX
x2X
X
y2Y
p(x, y) log(p(y)) =
X
y2Y
log(p(y))
X
x2X
p(x, y)
=
X
y2Y
log(p(y))p(y). (22)
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C Derivation of the mutual information condi-
tioned on x
With p(x, y) = p(y|x)p(x), (20) can be reformulated in terms of entropies con-
ditioned on x:
I(X;Y ) = 
X
x2X
X
y2Y
p(x, y) log(p(y))
+
X
x2X
X
y2Y
p(x, y) log(p(y|x))
= 
X
x2X
p(x)
X
y2Y
p(y|x) log(p(y))
 
0@ X
x2X
p(x)
X
y2Y
p(y|x) log(p(y|x))
1A
= 
X
x2X
p(x)
"X
y2Y
p(y|x) log(p(y))
 
0@ X
y2Y
p(y|x) log(p(y|x))
1A# (23)
= 
X
x2X
p(x)
"X
y2Y
p(y|x) log(p(y)) H(Y |x)
#
.
D Proof of Corollary 1
With the law of total expectation p(y) =
P
x2X p(x, y) and p(x, y) = p(y|x)p(x)
we have X
x2X
X
y2Y
p(x)p(y|x) log(p(y)) =
X
y2Y
X
x2X
p(x)p(y|x) log(p(y))
=
X
y2Y
X
x2X
p(x, y) log(p(y))
=
X
y2Y
p(y) log(p(y)) = H(Y ).
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